Failures to recognize the chaos engulfing the country and to send in enough troops to restore order after the 2003 invasion have long been highlighted by critics, but a new report shows the Army assessing itself.
Frank opinions from officers serving in the 18 months from the start of war to Iraqi elections in January 2005 reveal there were concerns at the time, not just about assumptions made by planners but at decisions taken once U.S.-led coalition forces had control of Iraq.
"I flipped," Gen. Jack Keane, then the Army's deputy chief of staff, told the historians of his reaction to a June 2003 decision to transfer control of all coalition troops away from the land forces command that had been preparing for the mission.
He recounted a conversation with Gen. John Abizaid, who succeeded the invasion's architect, Gen. Tommy Franks. "I said, 'Jesus Christ, John, this is a recipe for disaster. We invested in that headquarters. We have the experience and judgment in that headquarters."
Keane said it took the U.S. command between six and eight months to get the new headquarters up and running. During that time, troops in the field saw the mood of ordinary Iraqis turn against Americans and watched the insurgency take root.
"By the time we got a plan together to resource everything, the insurgents had closed that window of opportunity quickly," Col. David Perkins, a brigade commander in the Army's 3rd Infantry Division, told the historians. "What we started doing in September was probably a good idea to have done in April 2003."
Franks, who would soon retire and be awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom, said he ordered the transition to force the Pentagon to get leaders into the field to work with civilian occupation officials.
"That is a task that John Abizaid and I very simply laid on Washington and said, 'Figure it out. Do it fast. Get me a joint headquarters in here. We have a lot of work to do and [civilian administrator of Iraq] Jerry Bremer has a lot of responsibility and he needs help,' " he recalled.
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