OrangeEmpire
The White Debonair
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Abstract: I will quickly survey traditional arguments for the existence of God. I will then go on to the question of even if the arguments are sound, how does inference that the Western monotheistic God (WMG) logically function? In other words, how strong is the move from the traditional core arguments to the existence of God?
I. Traditional Arguments (If you are familiar with these already, feel free to skip -- nothing you probably haven't already heard)
There are traditionally 3 main arguments for the existence of God:
(1) The Cosmological Argument: I have seen this argued in generically similar ways by quite a few members here over the time I've spent roaming these parts of the surf (for instance, REVROSWELL):
1. For every thing in the universe, if a thing begins to exist, then that thing has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
(2) The Design Argument: This, in my experience, appears to be the most intuitively true for religious persons (because it captures more of the awe of things of our personal experiences in the universe):
1. Machines are like humans.
2. For all things in the universe, if a thing is a machine, then that thing has an intelligent designer (one who designed it).
3. Therefore, [at least, probably] Humans
(3) The Ontological Argument:
1. All other things being equal between two objects (x and y), if x exists in reality and the mind, and y exists in the mind but not in reality, then x is GREATER than y.
(Note: if something exists in neither reality nor the mind, then that thing is not a significant --meaningful, or sensible-- thing)
2. The greatest being imaginable would have to exist both in reality and imagination.
3. God, by definition, is the GREATEST being imaginable.
(Assumed premise --
i.e. denial of our desired conclusion
that God exists):
4. God does not exist.
5. God is not the greatest being imaginable.
6. God is the greatest being imaginable, and God is not the greatest being imaginable.
7. Therefore, (because 6. is a logical contradiction, and we got from assuming God does not exist) God exists!
II. Missing the Point &
the Fascinating Thing About the O-Argument
Setting aside the proper analysis of these arguments (which would certainly involve more charitable representations of them), the important question is: Are these argument safely bridged to the existence of God?
It would seem that the arguments above require an ally-oop of some sort. By themselves, they simply miss their overall target: trying to demonstrate in some way that God exists. The only exception above is that of the Ontological Argument (the O-Argument). What makes this interesting is that this is the only argument that gets us straight to the hoop, but does so in a very different method than the others above.
The O-Argument does not argue from some event in the universe, or the existence of the universe itself; in other words, it does not argue from 'empirical evidence'. It gives us definitions that appear to be as undeniable as '2+2=4', and attempts to advance directly to the conclusions that if we assume God does not exist, then logical contradictions follow, and therefore making God's existence neccessary. At the end, we will to return to this possible beacon of theological light.
III. The Nature of the Move
Here, I will not survey other philosophers' ways of bridging the gap between their ordinary arguments and the existence of God. Rather, I will offer some of my own thoughts (that may or may not cross over into already published and thoroughly weeded discourse).
What type of argument will substantiate the move from the Cosmo- and Design Arguments?
(1) The Deductively Valid Route: I do not completely rule out the deductively valid route. Perhaps, a general rule can be made that:
For all things in the universe, if either that thing is the cause for the universe, or the designer (or both), then that thing is God.
What is meant by God will be: omnipotent, omniscient, etc. etc.
Now, if something causes the universe, or designs it, how is that we can conditionally come to know it also as all-knowing, all-powerful, perfectly good, and free? I would firstly say that the conditional itself is questionable, and does not solve the problem, but really just begs the question.
Also, even if we alter the nature of the conditional, we still are left with the interesting first clause 'For all thing in the universe'. Certainly, many theists are prone to say that God is somehow above, or beyond the universe. God is, in some sense, not necessarily attached to it, being that he is perfectly free, and even if he just happened to be attached to it, he would not be in it. But, ah-ha! God is everywhere! Including in the universe! But, God cannot exhaustively be in the universe; in other words, there must be some of him that is not in the universe, even if some of him is. This is because God would then have temporal locations and extension, making him lose sovereignty... I am going to stop here with this and continue (I am running out of time!)
(2) The Inductively Strong Route: Ignoring the above, though, could we not just make God as being a conservative, or simplest filling to the individual variable that is supposed to be the designer or cause (or both)? If so, it could not be deductive, for even if a thing is the most conservative or simple (or both) filling, it could still end up false without self-contradiction. Thus, we are actually left with a probability conditionalized in relation to its degree of agreement to prior established theories, and how simple it is.
But, how simple is the God theory? Because of God's attributes, we cannot determine what he WOULD do versus something else, because the way they logically function is that no matter what he does do, there is always an entirely unobservable way out to make it consistent. For example, if we have a man who says that God told him to go to a day care centre, poke out all of the eye balls of the children, molest them, hang them on meat hooks, and then let them starve and bleed until they die, then we would still have no way of telling whether God would do that or not (given a proper logical evaluation of his predicates). For, perhaps, something repents this evil in the afterlife for the kids; maybe, they get the best seats in the Big House (i.e. Heaven). Either way, we cannot say. Therefore, we cannot determine what God would or would not do.
If we cannot determine what a person would do or would not do, would our postulation of them for being designer or personal cause (or both) for our observations be simple? I think not. Simplicity, although vague, certainly must involve our hypothesis having some sort of decisiveness on the empirical world.
Is God conservative, though? How well does he agree with our prior established theories? Well, not very much, because he is an entity almost entirely different than the things that are involved in not just the root arguments (i.e. Cosmo- and Design), but of other deductively valid and inductively strong arguments used in logical and scientific analyses.
IV. Wrap Up!
In the previous section, we see that the 'move' is difficult to make clear if it is either deductively valid or inductively strong. Under the assumption that these are the only two general ways of reasoning, there is no rational warrent (thus far) for the move from the traditional arguments to God. But, we may wish to either revise my above analysis, or deny the working assumption of the deductively valid/inductively strong dichotomy. Either way, this area of theology is not something to ignore, or put on the back burner for too long while he or she is busy trying to work out the root arguments (just trying to find the first cause, or designer; the minimum!).
I. Traditional Arguments (If you are familiar with these already, feel free to skip -- nothing you probably haven't already heard)
There are traditionally 3 main arguments for the existence of God:
(1) The Cosmological Argument: I have seen this argued in generically similar ways by quite a few members here over the time I've spent roaming these parts of the surf (for instance, REVROSWELL):
1. For every thing in the universe, if a thing begins to exist, then that thing has a cause.
2. The universe began to exist.
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause.
(2) The Design Argument: This, in my experience, appears to be the most intuitively true for religious persons (because it captures more of the awe of things of our personal experiences in the universe):
1. Machines are like humans.
2. For all things in the universe, if a thing is a machine, then that thing has an intelligent designer (one who designed it).
3. Therefore, [at least, probably] Humans
(3) The Ontological Argument:
1. All other things being equal between two objects (x and y), if x exists in reality and the mind, and y exists in the mind but not in reality, then x is GREATER than y.
(Note: if something exists in neither reality nor the mind, then that thing is not a significant --meaningful, or sensible-- thing)
2. The greatest being imaginable would have to exist both in reality and imagination.
3. God, by definition, is the GREATEST being imaginable.
(Assumed premise --
i.e. denial of our desired conclusion
that God exists):
4. God does not exist.
5. God is not the greatest being imaginable.
6. God is the greatest being imaginable, and God is not the greatest being imaginable.
7. Therefore, (because 6. is a logical contradiction, and we got from assuming God does not exist) God exists!
II. Missing the Point &
the Fascinating Thing About the O-Argument
Setting aside the proper analysis of these arguments (which would certainly involve more charitable representations of them), the important question is: Are these argument safely bridged to the existence of God?
It would seem that the arguments above require an ally-oop of some sort. By themselves, they simply miss their overall target: trying to demonstrate in some way that God exists. The only exception above is that of the Ontological Argument (the O-Argument). What makes this interesting is that this is the only argument that gets us straight to the hoop, but does so in a very different method than the others above.
The O-Argument does not argue from some event in the universe, or the existence of the universe itself; in other words, it does not argue from 'empirical evidence'. It gives us definitions that appear to be as undeniable as '2+2=4', and attempts to advance directly to the conclusions that if we assume God does not exist, then logical contradictions follow, and therefore making God's existence neccessary. At the end, we will to return to this possible beacon of theological light.
III. The Nature of the Move
Here, I will not survey other philosophers' ways of bridging the gap between their ordinary arguments and the existence of God. Rather, I will offer some of my own thoughts (that may or may not cross over into already published and thoroughly weeded discourse).
What type of argument will substantiate the move from the Cosmo- and Design Arguments?
(1) The Deductively Valid Route: I do not completely rule out the deductively valid route. Perhaps, a general rule can be made that:
For all things in the universe, if either that thing is the cause for the universe, or the designer (or both), then that thing is God.
What is meant by God will be: omnipotent, omniscient, etc. etc.
Now, if something causes the universe, or designs it, how is that we can conditionally come to know it also as all-knowing, all-powerful, perfectly good, and free? I would firstly say that the conditional itself is questionable, and does not solve the problem, but really just begs the question.
Also, even if we alter the nature of the conditional, we still are left with the interesting first clause 'For all thing in the universe'. Certainly, many theists are prone to say that God is somehow above, or beyond the universe. God is, in some sense, not necessarily attached to it, being that he is perfectly free, and even if he just happened to be attached to it, he would not be in it. But, ah-ha! God is everywhere! Including in the universe! But, God cannot exhaustively be in the universe; in other words, there must be some of him that is not in the universe, even if some of him is. This is because God would then have temporal locations and extension, making him lose sovereignty... I am going to stop here with this and continue (I am running out of time!)
(2) The Inductively Strong Route: Ignoring the above, though, could we not just make God as being a conservative, or simplest filling to the individual variable that is supposed to be the designer or cause (or both)? If so, it could not be deductive, for even if a thing is the most conservative or simple (or both) filling, it could still end up false without self-contradiction. Thus, we are actually left with a probability conditionalized in relation to its degree of agreement to prior established theories, and how simple it is.
But, how simple is the God theory? Because of God's attributes, we cannot determine what he WOULD do versus something else, because the way they logically function is that no matter what he does do, there is always an entirely unobservable way out to make it consistent. For example, if we have a man who says that God told him to go to a day care centre, poke out all of the eye balls of the children, molest them, hang them on meat hooks, and then let them starve and bleed until they die, then we would still have no way of telling whether God would do that or not (given a proper logical evaluation of his predicates). For, perhaps, something repents this evil in the afterlife for the kids; maybe, they get the best seats in the Big House (i.e. Heaven). Either way, we cannot say. Therefore, we cannot determine what God would or would not do.
If we cannot determine what a person would do or would not do, would our postulation of them for being designer or personal cause (or both) for our observations be simple? I think not. Simplicity, although vague, certainly must involve our hypothesis having some sort of decisiveness on the empirical world.
Is God conservative, though? How well does he agree with our prior established theories? Well, not very much, because he is an entity almost entirely different than the things that are involved in not just the root arguments (i.e. Cosmo- and Design), but of other deductively valid and inductively strong arguments used in logical and scientific analyses.
IV. Wrap Up!
In the previous section, we see that the 'move' is difficult to make clear if it is either deductively valid or inductively strong. Under the assumption that these are the only two general ways of reasoning, there is no rational warrent (thus far) for the move from the traditional arguments to God. But, we may wish to either revise my above analysis, or deny the working assumption of the deductively valid/inductively strong dichotomy. Either way, this area of theology is not something to ignore, or put on the back burner for too long while he or she is busy trying to work out the root arguments (just trying to find the first cause, or designer; the minimum!).
