PKT, Question Re: Rights

[therealUT]

I am just curious, is your objection to the notion of Natural Rights that they are often implied to have some type of moral obligation attached?

For instance, many rights theorists will make propose the following premises:

A right is a claim.
A duty/obligation is the correlative of a claim.
Morally, one ought to fulfill their duties.

However, plenty of moral theories readily discard the third premise (and replace with premises such as: morally, one ought to maximize utility); yet, discarding the third premise has no effect on the first two.

Now, I do understand that getting rid of three might simply invite the response of: Okay, but then, if Natural Rights do exist, they are meaningless. But, that might not be true, depending on one's moral theory.

For instance, suppose one has a moral theory that simply says, "One ought to optimize their own well-being/flourishing; and, in order to do that, one needs to consult the set of principles w, x, y, and z". It is likely that in some circumstances x and z advise conflicting decisions; but, that does not mean that as principles they are either defunct or meaningless.

Now, I think we can reasonably assume that individuals outside of any society would still claim the following:
1. That others have an obligation not to harm/kill them.
2. That others have an obligation of non-interference with toward them.
3. That others have an obligation not to take what is "mine" (whether or not one has a valid reason to assert that this particular thing is, in fact, his is a completely different question).

Of course, as correlatives, this would give us the claims (that is the rights) to life, liberty, and property. These rights might certainly be synthentic a priori or even a posteriori necessary truths (one might not realize they have a claim until they feel they have been "wronged" or unjustly treated; but, individuals certainly must have felt that they were unjustly treated before they set down rules).

 

[PKT_VOL]

No. My objection to natural rights has nothing to do with duty based ethics/morality. I know you're a Kant fan. Conversely, I reject Kant's duty based ethics.

My point of contention with innate natural rights is based in my biological perspective of the world and Jean-Paul Sartre's notion of "existence precedes essence."

John Locke, Thomas Hobbs, and Thomas Paine posited that humans had fundamental (naturally innate) inalienable rights which could not be infringed upon under any circumstance. The argument went something like this.

1) We are life. We have an innate interest to stay alive. Thus, life should not be extinguished.

2) Humans want to be free. They ought to be free as long as that freedom does not infringe upon the most basic inalienable right #1.

3) Land ought to be under control of a man who puts his labor into it so long as it does not violate the more fundamental inalienable rights of #1 and #2.

As you can see, the whole argument is built upon the original premise and #1 fundamental inalienable right being the right to one's own life. The other two "inalienable rights" are built off the first. Add in Hobbs, who inspired Locke, was a big proponent of innate human behavior. The founding premise, in which all three original inalienable rights diverge, is based on a innate human reaction; the will to survive. Thus, the inalienable rights is based on the human essence. Take it one step further, they believed in a metaphysical creator of life. Thus, inalienable rights can be traced back to "God."

Now to my divergence from Locke, Hobbs, and Paine. First, I do not believe in the metaphysical entity (Judo-Christian God). Thus, any "inalienable rights" cannot possibly be derived from God. Secondly, add in biology and Sartre. When you are born, that is all that happens. You do not suddenly have "rights" bestowed upon you in a naturally innate manner. You are just a human being alive on a watery blue planet in a vast universe. (Sartre's "existence")

However, this does not mean that I don't believe people within our society ought to have certain inalienable rights. But "ought" is the key word. It is a monumental difference. The "ought" in my support of Locke, Hobbs, and Paine make inalienable rights artificial in nature. They are derived from human intuition, thus not naturally innate. For instance, my "inalienable rights" upon my birth were bestowed or grandfathered upon me by parents' generation via their social contact. Now that I am of legal age, I have entered into the current social contract. (Sartre's essence)

For instance, many rights theorists will make propose the following premises:

A right is a claim.
A duty/obligation is the correlative of a claim.
Morally, one ought to fulfill their duties.

However, plenty of moral theories readily discard the third premise (and replace with premises such as: morally, one ought to maximize utility); yet, discarding the third premise has no effect on the first two.

I would fall in the latter category. I am a Utilitarian.

I would only add that the first two premises are fully subjective; not objective.

Now, I do understand that getting rid of three might simply invite the response of: Okay, but then, if Natural Rights do exist, they are meaningless. But, that might not be true, depending on one's moral theory.

For instance, suppose one has a moral theory that simply says, "One ought to optimize their own well-being/flourishing; and, in order to do that, one needs to consult the set of principles w, x, y, and z". It is likely that in some circumstances x and z advise conflicting decisions; but, that does not mean that as principles they are either defunct or meaningless.

I think you are going off on an unnecessary tangent. Natural rights are more in the realm of ethics instead of morality. If you (TRUT) hold natural rights to be x,y,z that is meaningless in the grand scheme of things. I understand that ethics is born out of morality; one can think of ethics as "collective morality". However, the natural rights (as we see them as Americans) are society based; thus ethical in nature rather than moral in nature.

Now, I think we can reasonably assume that individuals outside of any society would still claim the following:
1. That others have an obligation not to harm/kill them.
2. That others have an obligation of non-interference with toward them.
3. That others have an obligation not to take what is "mine" (whether or not one has a valid reason to assert that this particular thing is, in fact, his is a completely different question).

Of course, as correlatives, this would give us the claims (that is the rights) to life, liberty, and property. These rights might certainly be synthentic a priori or even a posteriori necessary truths (one might not realize they have a claim until they feel they have been "wronged" or unjustly treated; but, individuals certainly must have felt that they were unjustly treated before they set down rules).

I have to disagree here. The only one that I would agree with is the right to life. This is because humans (as any form of life) have the natural desire to survive. Such a desire is certainly a priori in nature.

The last two claims are certainly a posteriori in nature. One is "taught" those values either by others or by their own experiences. Other people could have different inspirations and different experiences which prevent them from valuing proposition number two and proposition number three.