We judge the US Homeland will face a persistent and evolving terrorist threat over the next three years. The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells, especially al-Qaida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to adapt and improve their capabilities.
We assess that greatly increased worldwide counterterrorism efforts over the past five years have constrained the ability of al-Qaida to attack the US Homeland again and have led terrorist groups to perceive the Homeland as a harder target to strike than on 9/11.
These measures have helped disrupt known plots against the United States since 9/11.
We are concerned, however, that this level of international cooperation may wane as
9/11 becomes a more distant memory and perceptions of the threat diverge.
Al-Qaida is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central leadership continues to plan high-impact plots, while pushing others in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement its capabilities. We assess the group has protected or regenerated key elements of its Homeland attack capability, including: a safehaven in the Pakistan Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), operational lieutenants, and its top leadership. Although we have discovered only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to al-Qaida senior leadership since 9/11, we judge that al-Qaida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.
As a result, we judge that the United States currently is in a heightened threat
environment.
We assess that al-Qaida will continue to enhance its capabilities to attack the Homeland
through greater cooperation with regional terrorist groups. Of note, we assess that al-Qaida will probably seek to leverage the contacts and capabilities of al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), its most visible and capable affiliate and the only one known to have expressed a desire to attack the Homeland. In addition, we assess that its association with AQI helps al-Qaida to energize the broader Sunni extremist community, raise resources, and to recruit and indoctrinate operatives, including for Homeland attacks.
We assess that al-Qaidas Homeland plotting is likely to continue to focus on prominent
political, economic, and infrastructure targets with the goal of producing mass casualties,
visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the US population. The group is proficient with conventional small arms and improvised explosive devices, and is innovative in creating new capabilities and overcoming security obstacles.
We assess that al-Qaida will continue to try to acquire and employ chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear material in attacks and would not hesitate to use
them if it develops what it deems is sufficient capability.
We assess Lebanese Hizballah, which has conducted anti-US attacks outside the United
States in the past, may be more likely to consider attacking the Homeland over the next three years if it perceives the United States as posing a direct threat to the group or Iran.
We assess that the spread of radicalespecially SalafiInternet sites, increasingly
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical and violent segment of the Wests Muslim population is expanding, including in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States who are becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense to the global extremist movementpoints to the possibility that others may become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here as legitimate. We assess that this internal Muslim terrorist threat is not likely to be as severe as it is in Europe, however.
