AQIM operates and has operated out of Algeria and Tunisia for years and has never attacked outside its region; aka, AQIM actually attacks targets in Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania. They have avoided attacking targets in Libya due mainly to both their belief that Qadaffi is advancing a militant Islamic agenda and their fear of retribution from Qadaffi and his forces.
For compelling insight into this, you should look to Leah Farrall.
For compelling insight into this, you should look to Leah Farrall.
Around the same time, bin Laden also unsuccessfully lobbied the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group to join al Qaeda’s efforts. And although al Qaeda supported the militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in his establishment of an independent training camp in Afghanistan, bin Laden was unable to convince him to formally join the organization.
The only real success during this period was al Qaeda’s mid-2001 merger with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, now al Qaeda’s second-in-command. The merger was possible thanks to Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s weakened position and its reliance on bin Laden for money. The decision was nevertheless contentious within Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and several of its members left rather than join with al Qaeda. In the end, al Qaeda’s only successful merger during its Afghanistan years added just five people to its core membership. Compared to this dismal record, the past decade has been highly successful.
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Although opening a regional branch and acquiring franchises has reinforced the position of al Qaeda and its ability to present itself as both the senior and the most capable Islamist militant group, it approaches new mergers warily. Al Qaeda learned a lesson about overreach in 2006, when it attempted to bring splinter groups from the Egyptian Islamic Group and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group under its umbrella. In an ill-calculated move, it portrayed the joining of the splinter factions as formal mergers with al Qaeda, which elicited heavy criticism from both groups’ leaders, who opposed unification with al Qaeda. This criticism has, however, minimally impacted al Qaeda’s appeal with its target audience — those already radicalized to its cause but not yet part of the organization — and other groups still seek to join under al Qaeda’s banner. Al Qaeda is nonetheless wary of attracting criticism from other militants, so it is reticent to accept groups that have not demonstrated unified leadership within their areas of operation.
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Obviously not new, but this is important, particularly given recent reports the US is considering changing Sudan’s terror list status.
Around 150 mujahideen recruited every month. This figure is for internal and external recruits. The list of countries includes Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Morocco, Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Sudan, Kenya, Niger, Chad, Ethiopia, Somalia, Ghana and Rwanda.
While I’m a little skeptical of these figures and even some of these countries, this is none the less very interesting. It points to AQAP being a regional hub of sorts, and also attracting people who might have otherwise gone to Afghanistan or elsewhere. We’ve seen quite a few reports of AQ figures or others saying they can’t accommodate a great number of foreign fighters in Afghanistan/Pakistan; in other words they’ve reached sufficiency. What it boils down to is that HQ is the recruitment house for external operations. AQAP is the AQ front of choice.
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I think that Mr. “Mujdeh” does not know what happened in detail, or he expresses a retaliatory viewpoint.
You have a question about two people, Abu Zubaydah (a Jordanian / Palestinian), and Ibn Sheikh (a Libyan), and whether they were from al Qaeda.
And the two camps (Khalden) and (Duronta), and whether the two camps were independent.
Of course I know Ibn Sheikh al Libi and Abu Zubaydah and considered them among my friends even though we did not have work in common.
Both before and during the events of September they were not in al Qaeda. I do not know what their situation was after the incident. Because many of those who were neutral or even opposed to bin Laden went and gave bayah (*oath of allegiance) , driven by the enthusiasm of the success of the September operation.
I know part of the story of camp (Khalden) and I visited it once or twice. It did not belong to al Qaeda. But it was somehow competition to it.
The camp was established by the Services Office established by Abdullah Azzam. And the Services Office after the death of its founder was a competitor to bin Laden and al Qaeda, and more linked to “Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,” while “bin Laden” was closer to “Hekmatyar,” from who he rented the land upon which he built a series of camps in Khost (Jihad Wal, al Siddiq and al-Faruq).
I do not know much about the camp “Derunta.” But information I heard which I think is accurate is that the Egyptian Chemical Engineer “Abu Khabab” was the pillar of that camp and he taught explosives preparation chemistry.
All Things Counter Terrorism
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