OneManGang
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Tennessee vs The Maxims vs Georgia
Long-time readers will attest that your humble scribe places much of the blame for Tennessee's troubles under Butch Jones to three factors:
1) Mediocre recruiting during the later years of the reign of Sir Philip of Winchester which led to the Kiffin experiment with its collection of cutpurses and varlets compounded by whatever Derek Dooley was doing from 2010-2012. This lackluster period resulted in:
2) A steep and precipitous drop in the Vols' overall talent level, particularly in the offensive and defensive lines and, finally:
3) In many ways the most important issue in 2014 is experience. The Vols are a team consisting primarily of young men whose main concern this time last year was which delectable young maiden would accompany them to the Homecoming Dance in the gym.
They called it the Silent Service. Their missions were secret, their targets rarely knew they were under attack until torpedoes detonated against the hull. They were the American Submariners in the Pacific in World War II. At no time did their numbers ever comprise more than 2% of the US Navy. When it came to "punching above their weight" the American sub crews took a back seat to no one. In the final tally, over 30% of the Japanese Navy vessels sunk and nearly 70% of Japan's merchant fleet which was destroyed during the war were victims of submarine attack.
To achieve all this, though, the submarines had to overcome three major problems related to their primary weapon, the Mark 14 torpedo. The Mark 14 was supposed to be the submariner's ultimate weapon. It was fast (46 knots), had a long range (up to 9,000 yards), had an improved warhead carrying 631 lbs of TORPEX (TORPedo EXplosive), and carried the revolutionary Mark 6 magnetic exploder. The doctrine called for the torpedo to be set to run UNDER an enemy ship where the magnetic exploder would set off the TORPEX, breaking the ship's keel. In case the depth estimate was off, the torpedo also carried a normal contact detonator.
As the last Japanese planes departed the airspace over Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the order went out to the entire fleet in the Pacific, "Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." Would that such decisiveness existed in the 21st Century, but I digress. Sub commanders across the Pacific rubbed their hands at the thought of what the Mark 14 would do to the Japanese.
At first, the primary sub combat was carried out by old "S"-class boats based in the Philippines. Their efforts were mostly ineffective and then the Japanese bombed the main torpedo storage and repair facility at the Cavite. The "S" boats used the Mark 10 torpedo which entered service before WWI. The newer "Fleet" boats left Pearl on their first patrols and they were carrying the Mark 14. Almost immediately, reports came back from sub skippers that the damned things didn't work. However, there were some successful attacks using the Mark 14, so the skippers were told to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well.
By mid-1942, though, the chorus of complaints had not abated, indeed it had grown louder as now the skippers had the experience to know when a torpedo hit and when it didn't. The Big Boss of the Pacific Fleet subs, Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood, sent inquiries to the Bureau of Ordinance (BuOrd) which had developed and tested the Mark 14 and politely asked what was the deal? BuOrd sent back a stiff note telling Lockwood to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well. Lockwood was compelled to pass on this bit of wisdom.
By the end of 1942, Lockwood was faced with a near-revolt by his sub skippers over the (non) performance of the Mark 14. Compounding Lockwood's problems was the establishment of a separate submarine command in Australia under Admiral Ralph Christie who had won his spurs at BuOrd as one of the officers intimately connected with the development and testing of, you guessed it, the Mark 14. Christie was absolutely livid that these mere two-and-a-half and three stripers* would dare question the self-proclaimed geniuses at BuOrd and refused to even consider the possibility that there were problems with the Mark 14. He rather angrily told his skippers to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well.
Fed up, Lockwood finally did what BuOrd should have been doing throughout the development process and ordered a series of live-fire exercises with the Mark 14. Over the next eight months three critical problems were identified:
1) The TORPEX warhead was far heavier than the water-filled simulators used in BuOrd tests and caused the "fish" to run anywhere from 8 to 25 feet deeper than set. This was corrected by resetting the depth control mechanism.
2) The Mark 6 exploder only functioned correctly about 10-15% of the time. This was due to it having never been tested in tropical climates and the fact that in the entire US Navy there were only TWO maintenance manuals available due to obsessive secrecy. Lockwood immediately ordered his skippers to disable the Mark 6 and set their torpedoes for contact hits. Christie hit the ceiling. This resulted in the odd situation that when subs were transferred from Hawaii to Australia they had to first disable and then enable the Mark 6 and vise-versa. Finally the gentlemen at BuOrd had to admit Lockwood was right and ordered all Mark 6s disabled. Christie complied grudgingly.
3) Finally, it was discovered that the "old reliable" contact exploder had its own problems. The firing pin was held in place by a series of flimsy guides which could be easily deformed by, say, the impact of a torpedo against the hull of a ship and jam the mechanism before the firing pin could hit the primer and set off the TORPEX. Fleet machine shops quickly churned out more robust guides.
A Congressional investigation later revealed that BuOrd had NEVER, not once before 1943, carried out a live-fire test of a complete Mark 14.
Unforgivable.
Vietnam vets out there are nodding. A very similar situation surrounded the initial issue of the M-16 to troops in the 'Nam.
Head Vol Butch Jones inherited the three problems with his team identified earlier. He has energetically attacked the recruiting and talent issues. Only time, and unfortunately, losses in big games identifying further issues needing correction can solve the the experience problem.
It's not acceptable to Vol fans that their beloved team is here, but only time and a heck of a lot of sweat will turn things around. It is this writer's opinion that we've found our Admiral Lockwood. Better days are ahead.
So how did the team do compared to the Maxims?
1. The team that makes the fewest mistakes will win.
In order to prevail against an opponent of Georgia's caliber, the Vols needed to play nearly error-free football. Alas! Tennessee was penalized seven times, very nearly equaling their total for the previous three games - COMBINED. Then there was what may go down in Tennessee lore as "The Fumble." In an eerie repeat of Pig Howard's failure to maintain possession while diving over the pylon last year, Justin Worley and Jalen Hurd mishandled a routine handoff in the endzone and a joyful Dawg defender landed on it for a "Fat Man's Dream" touchdown. That score provided the Mutts with all the points they would need.
2. Play for and make the breaks. When one comes your way SCORE!
Mutt quarterback Hutson Mason tossed two interceptions. Tennessee came away with zilch each time. Then there was the drive in the 3rd Canto that saw Tennessee march to the UGA 23 when Marlon Lane decided he could run better without the ball and left it on the ground. Not good enough. Not even close.
3. If at first the game or the breaks go against you, dont let up PUT ON MORE STEAM!
Last year, long-suffering Vol fans were treated to total defensive collapses on several occasions. Your humble scribe took to calling this the "Incredible Disappearing Vol Defense." Good news: the overall defensive effort was good. Bad news: now Tennessee seems to have an "Incredible Disappearing Run Defense."
4. Protect our kickers, our quarterback, our lead and our ballgame.
Allowing the Dawgs to reel off 21 unanswered points after Tennessee surged to a 10-0 lead was a critical failure, letting Todd Gurley get loose for a 51-yard touchdown run after closing the gap to 21-17 even more so. Georgia's defensive line pressured Justin Worley the entire game and knocked him out with an elbow injury for three critical drives. The Orange Heart Award for this game goes to said Justin Worley for coming back and leading Tennessee's final two scoring drives in the fourth quarter.
5. Ball! Oskie! Cover, block, cut and slice, pursue and gang tackle THIS IS THE WINNING EDGE.
Mutt running back Todd Gurley had TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE all-purpose yards (208 net rushing, 30 receiving, 47 return) Saturday. Allowing a single player to dominate to that extent violates both the letter and the spirit of this Maxim. Worse, vaunted Vol running back Marlon Lane rushed for exactly ONE net yard ... and lost the aforementioned fumble. *bangs head*
6. Press the kicking game. Here is where the breaks are made.
After the Oklahoma game this writer was quite critical of Matt Darr's efforts. Saturday he averaged 44 yards per kick. Well done, Matt, well done! Less well done was a failure in punt coverage which set the Dawgs up in scoring position and resulted in their first touchdown. It would also seem the Vols need to work on their onside kick scheme.
7. Carry the fight to Georgia and keep it there for sixty minutes.
It did warm the cockles of this Old Vol's heart to see Tennessee keep scrapping and fighting to the final gun.
Your humble scribe stands by his statement from the Arkansas State game: "The SEEDS of greatness are being sown. Harvest won't be for some time yet. Enjoy the wins, look for positives in losses and settle in for the ride."
During the course of the war in the Pacific a total of 52 American subs were lost. 3,506 submariners are saluted by their shipmates as being "forever on patrol." How many of these losses were a result of the failings of the Mark 14 is unknown, and that's probably for the best.
It's time to quit dwelling on the past failings of Tennessee football. The Giant Water Lizards are coming our way!
Brick by Brick, Baby!
MAXOMG
*This refers to the stripes on the shoulder boards or the cuffs of a naval officer's uniform. Two and a half stripes indicates a Lt. Commander and three stripes is a full commander which equals a Lt. Colonel. Subs only had crews of 50 to 70 and so were commanded by these ranks.
Suggested Reading:
Silent Victory by Clay Blair
Thunder Below! by Eugene Fluckey
Clear the Bridge! by Richard H. O'Kane
© 2014
Keeping Your Stories Alive
Long-time readers will attest that your humble scribe places much of the blame for Tennessee's troubles under Butch Jones to three factors:
1) Mediocre recruiting during the later years of the reign of Sir Philip of Winchester which led to the Kiffin experiment with its collection of cutpurses and varlets compounded by whatever Derek Dooley was doing from 2010-2012. This lackluster period resulted in:
2) A steep and precipitous drop in the Vols' overall talent level, particularly in the offensive and defensive lines and, finally:
3) In many ways the most important issue in 2014 is experience. The Vols are a team consisting primarily of young men whose main concern this time last year was which delectable young maiden would accompany them to the Homecoming Dance in the gym.
They called it the Silent Service. Their missions were secret, their targets rarely knew they were under attack until torpedoes detonated against the hull. They were the American Submariners in the Pacific in World War II. At no time did their numbers ever comprise more than 2% of the US Navy. When it came to "punching above their weight" the American sub crews took a back seat to no one. In the final tally, over 30% of the Japanese Navy vessels sunk and nearly 70% of Japan's merchant fleet which was destroyed during the war were victims of submarine attack.
To achieve all this, though, the submarines had to overcome three major problems related to their primary weapon, the Mark 14 torpedo. The Mark 14 was supposed to be the submariner's ultimate weapon. It was fast (46 knots), had a long range (up to 9,000 yards), had an improved warhead carrying 631 lbs of TORPEX (TORPedo EXplosive), and carried the revolutionary Mark 6 magnetic exploder. The doctrine called for the torpedo to be set to run UNDER an enemy ship where the magnetic exploder would set off the TORPEX, breaking the ship's keel. In case the depth estimate was off, the torpedo also carried a normal contact detonator.
As the last Japanese planes departed the airspace over Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 the order went out to the entire fleet in the Pacific, "Execute unrestricted air and submarine warfare against Japan." Would that such decisiveness existed in the 21st Century, but I digress. Sub commanders across the Pacific rubbed their hands at the thought of what the Mark 14 would do to the Japanese.
At first, the primary sub combat was carried out by old "S"-class boats based in the Philippines. Their efforts were mostly ineffective and then the Japanese bombed the main torpedo storage and repair facility at the Cavite. The "S" boats used the Mark 10 torpedo which entered service before WWI. The newer "Fleet" boats left Pearl on their first patrols and they were carrying the Mark 14. Almost immediately, reports came back from sub skippers that the damned things didn't work. However, there were some successful attacks using the Mark 14, so the skippers were told to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well.
By mid-1942, though, the chorus of complaints had not abated, indeed it had grown louder as now the skippers had the experience to know when a torpedo hit and when it didn't. The Big Boss of the Pacific Fleet subs, Rear Admiral Charles Lockwood, sent inquiries to the Bureau of Ordinance (BuOrd) which had developed and tested the Mark 14 and politely asked what was the deal? BuOrd sent back a stiff note telling Lockwood to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well. Lockwood was compelled to pass on this bit of wisdom.
By the end of 1942, Lockwood was faced with a near-revolt by his sub skippers over the (non) performance of the Mark 14. Compounding Lockwood's problems was the establishment of a separate submarine command in Australia under Admiral Ralph Christie who had won his spurs at BuOrd as one of the officers intimately connected with the development and testing of, you guessed it, the Mark 14. Christie was absolutely livid that these mere two-and-a-half and three stripers* would dare question the self-proclaimed geniuses at BuOrd and refused to even consider the possibility that there were problems with the Mark 14. He rather angrily told his skippers to shut up, use the things as directed, and all would be well.
Fed up, Lockwood finally did what BuOrd should have been doing throughout the development process and ordered a series of live-fire exercises with the Mark 14. Over the next eight months three critical problems were identified:
1) The TORPEX warhead was far heavier than the water-filled simulators used in BuOrd tests and caused the "fish" to run anywhere from 8 to 25 feet deeper than set. This was corrected by resetting the depth control mechanism.
2) The Mark 6 exploder only functioned correctly about 10-15% of the time. This was due to it having never been tested in tropical climates and the fact that in the entire US Navy there were only TWO maintenance manuals available due to obsessive secrecy. Lockwood immediately ordered his skippers to disable the Mark 6 and set their torpedoes for contact hits. Christie hit the ceiling. This resulted in the odd situation that when subs were transferred from Hawaii to Australia they had to first disable and then enable the Mark 6 and vise-versa. Finally the gentlemen at BuOrd had to admit Lockwood was right and ordered all Mark 6s disabled. Christie complied grudgingly.
3) Finally, it was discovered that the "old reliable" contact exploder had its own problems. The firing pin was held in place by a series of flimsy guides which could be easily deformed by, say, the impact of a torpedo against the hull of a ship and jam the mechanism before the firing pin could hit the primer and set off the TORPEX. Fleet machine shops quickly churned out more robust guides.
A Congressional investigation later revealed that BuOrd had NEVER, not once before 1943, carried out a live-fire test of a complete Mark 14.
Unforgivable.
Vietnam vets out there are nodding. A very similar situation surrounded the initial issue of the M-16 to troops in the 'Nam.
Head Vol Butch Jones inherited the three problems with his team identified earlier. He has energetically attacked the recruiting and talent issues. Only time, and unfortunately, losses in big games identifying further issues needing correction can solve the the experience problem.
It's not acceptable to Vol fans that their beloved team is here, but only time and a heck of a lot of sweat will turn things around. It is this writer's opinion that we've found our Admiral Lockwood. Better days are ahead.
So how did the team do compared to the Maxims?
1. The team that makes the fewest mistakes will win.
In order to prevail against an opponent of Georgia's caliber, the Vols needed to play nearly error-free football. Alas! Tennessee was penalized seven times, very nearly equaling their total for the previous three games - COMBINED. Then there was what may go down in Tennessee lore as "The Fumble." In an eerie repeat of Pig Howard's failure to maintain possession while diving over the pylon last year, Justin Worley and Jalen Hurd mishandled a routine handoff in the endzone and a joyful Dawg defender landed on it for a "Fat Man's Dream" touchdown. That score provided the Mutts with all the points they would need.
2. Play for and make the breaks. When one comes your way SCORE!
Mutt quarterback Hutson Mason tossed two interceptions. Tennessee came away with zilch each time. Then there was the drive in the 3rd Canto that saw Tennessee march to the UGA 23 when Marlon Lane decided he could run better without the ball and left it on the ground. Not good enough. Not even close.
3. If at first the game or the breaks go against you, dont let up PUT ON MORE STEAM!
Last year, long-suffering Vol fans were treated to total defensive collapses on several occasions. Your humble scribe took to calling this the "Incredible Disappearing Vol Defense." Good news: the overall defensive effort was good. Bad news: now Tennessee seems to have an "Incredible Disappearing Run Defense."
4. Protect our kickers, our quarterback, our lead and our ballgame.
Allowing the Dawgs to reel off 21 unanswered points after Tennessee surged to a 10-0 lead was a critical failure, letting Todd Gurley get loose for a 51-yard touchdown run after closing the gap to 21-17 even more so. Georgia's defensive line pressured Justin Worley the entire game and knocked him out with an elbow injury for three critical drives. The Orange Heart Award for this game goes to said Justin Worley for coming back and leading Tennessee's final two scoring drives in the fourth quarter.
5. Ball! Oskie! Cover, block, cut and slice, pursue and gang tackle THIS IS THE WINNING EDGE.
Mutt running back Todd Gurley had TWO HUNDRED EIGHTY-FIVE all-purpose yards (208 net rushing, 30 receiving, 47 return) Saturday. Allowing a single player to dominate to that extent violates both the letter and the spirit of this Maxim. Worse, vaunted Vol running back Marlon Lane rushed for exactly ONE net yard ... and lost the aforementioned fumble. *bangs head*
6. Press the kicking game. Here is where the breaks are made.
After the Oklahoma game this writer was quite critical of Matt Darr's efforts. Saturday he averaged 44 yards per kick. Well done, Matt, well done! Less well done was a failure in punt coverage which set the Dawgs up in scoring position and resulted in their first touchdown. It would also seem the Vols need to work on their onside kick scheme.
7. Carry the fight to Georgia and keep it there for sixty minutes.
It did warm the cockles of this Old Vol's heart to see Tennessee keep scrapping and fighting to the final gun.
Your humble scribe stands by his statement from the Arkansas State game: "The SEEDS of greatness are being sown. Harvest won't be for some time yet. Enjoy the wins, look for positives in losses and settle in for the ride."
During the course of the war in the Pacific a total of 52 American subs were lost. 3,506 submariners are saluted by their shipmates as being "forever on patrol." How many of these losses were a result of the failings of the Mark 14 is unknown, and that's probably for the best.
It's time to quit dwelling on the past failings of Tennessee football. The Giant Water Lizards are coming our way!
Brick by Brick, Baby!
MAXOMG
*This refers to the stripes on the shoulder boards or the cuffs of a naval officer's uniform. Two and a half stripes indicates a Lt. Commander and three stripes is a full commander which equals a Lt. Colonel. Subs only had crews of 50 to 70 and so were commanded by these ranks.
Suggested Reading:
Silent Victory by Clay Blair
Thunder Below! by Eugene Fluckey
Clear the Bridge! by Richard H. O'Kane
© 2014
Keeping Your Stories Alive
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