The Supreme Court held in Smith v. Maryland (1978) that government collection of phone numbers called does not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court reasoned that callers cannot have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial:
We doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial. All telephone users realize that they must convey phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed. All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills. . . .
Even if a caller did harbor some subjective expectation that the phone numbers he dialed would remain private, this expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. . . . This Court consistently has held that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties. . . . When a caller used his phone, he voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and exposed that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, the caller assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed.
In sum, the alleged government data collection described by USA Today does not, on its face, violate the Fourth Amendment.
Have you honestly convinced yourself there are not any foreseeable situations where a brief and temporary intrusion into constitutional liberties is not necessary? I only ask this question because anyone with even the slightest imagination could plausibly conceive of a scenario where this would be required and not ask such a question.
However, what if during a world war there was an effort to impede America's ability to effectively engage the enemy? Here are the facts from Schenk vs. United States: This is an indictment in three counts. The first charges a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, c. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219, by causing and attempting [*49] to cause [**248] insubordination, &c., in the military and naval forces of the United States, and to obstruct the recruiting and enlistment service of the United States, when the United States was at war with the German Empire, to-wit, that the defendants wilfully conspired to have printed and circulated to men who had been called and accepted for military service under the Act of May 18, 1917, a document set forth and alleged to be calculated to cause such insubordination and obstruction.
The count alleges overt acts in pursuance of the conspiracy, ending in the distribution of the document set forth. The second count alleges a conspiracy to commit an offence against the United States, to-wit, to use the mails for the transmission of matter declared to be non-mailable by Title XII, § 2 of the Act of June 15, 1917, to-wit, the above mentioned document, with an averment of the same overt acts. The third count charges an unlawful use of the mails for the transmission of the same matter and otherwise as above. The defendants were found guilty on all the counts. They set up the First Amendment to the Constitution forbidding Congress to make any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, and bringing the case here on that ground have argued some other points also of which we must dispose.......The document in question upon its first printed side recited the first section of the Thirteenth Amendment, said that the idea embodied in it was violated by the Conscription Act and that a conscript is little better than a [*51] convict.
In impassioned language it intimated that conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous wrong against humanity in the interest of Wall Street's chosen few. It said "Do not submit to intimidation," but in form at least confined itself to peaceful measures such as a petition for the repeal of the act. The other and later printed side of the sheet was headed "Assert Your Rights." It stated reasons for alleging that any one violated the Constitution when he refused to recognize "your right to assert your opposition to the draft," and went on "If you do not assert and support your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to retain." It described the arguments on the other side as coming from cunning politicians and a mercenary capitalist press, and even silent consent to the conscription law as helping to support an infamous conspiracy.
It denied the power to send our citizens away to foreign shores to shoot up the people of other lands, and added that words could not express the condemnation such cold-blooded ruthlessness deserves, &c., &c., winding up "You must do your share to maintain, support and uphold the rights of the people of this country." Of course the documents would not have been sent unless it had been intended to have some effect, and we do not see what effect it could be expected to have upon persons subject to the [**249] draft except to influence them to obstruct the carrying of it out. The defendants do not deny that the jury might find against them on this point.
Okay so these anti-war pamphlets were printed and strategically distributed. They were given to those enlisted men of the armed services whose deployment to combat was imminent. I am not going to resuscitate the facts. However, I do agree with the Court's holding. The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress [***474] has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree. When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any constitutional right. It seems to be admitted that if an actual obstruction of the recruiting service were proved, liability for words that produced that effect might be enforced. HN3The statute of 1917 in § 4 punishes conspiracies to obstruct as well as actual obstruction.
After the attack on Fort Sumter Abraham Lincoln, without the baptizing approval of Congress as they were away on recess, seized telegraph lines without a warrant, suspended habeus corpus without Congress' approval, called upon the raising of troops without Congressional approval (raising a militia), ordered a naval blockade of Southern Ports, proclaimed that all persons who discouraged enlistments or engaged in disloyal practices would come under Martial Law, and refused to comply with a federal circuit court decision ruling his suspension of habeus corpus as unconstitutional. Lincoln's famous remark forever immortalized, "Must the entire constitution be destroyed but one clause of it be saved?"
Most assuredly there are some instances where the temporary intrusion into constitutional liberties is required. These are perhaps two examples of those scenarios.