There was a substantial special operations campaign going on before the beginning of the war. Can you summarize the scale of that activity, and what they were doing?
In some ways, you could say this war began in about September 2002, which is when the special operations campaign against Iraq really geared up. It began as a psychological operations campaign with various components, all aimed at swaying Iraqi public opinion. Millions upon millions of leaflets were dropped on Iraqis, beginning around that time, I think fall of 2002, and escalating in number right up to the eve of the war in 2003.
It's a good question as to whether it had any success at all. This was probably, if not the largest, then the second-largest psychological operations campaign in history. I have yet to see an iota of evidence that it affected the opinion of a single Iraqi. No Iraqi I interviewed has ever mentioned, "Oh, yes, I got one of those leaflets, and that really persuaded me." I think it would be a good subject for a congressional investigation. I don't want to prejudge it. I'm not sure that anything really came of that.
Then the next phase on the special operations campaign was inserting various drops of stuff inside Iraq, so forces could operate behind enemy lines, or at least inside Iraq. So you had advance little bases put up with some ammunition, some water, communications gear, batteries, and so on -- 50 kilometers, 100 kilometers inside Iraq -- especially western Iraq, which is a largely empty desert, but which was of strategic concern because they didn't want Israel attacked from there. So that gears up.
Then the third thing was getting special operations troops into some of the key infrastructure, especially the oil fields, to prevent the oil fields from being destroyed, from manifolds from being blown up, things like that.
March 26, the U.S. paratroopers land in northern Iraq to open the battle of the northern front -- the new northern front, basically. Can you describe the landing, what it was for, and how it opened the northern front?
The U.S. had sworn that, even if it couldn't get the 4th Infantry Division in, it would get some troops into northern Iraq. So they went to the 173rd Air Brigade, which is based in Italy, its paratroopers, and got them into northern Iraq. They actually did a jump into Iraq, which a lot of people in the military thought was kind of cheesy, because there was no military need for it. There was sort of a sense that they were showing off. The response was, "Well, it demonstrates to the Iraqis that we're paratroopers." I'm not sure it meant a lot to people in Iraq.
So 173rd goes in, and starts operating with Kurdish forces in the north. I think it probably did achieve an American presence there, kept the Kurds from sort of saying, "We're in charge here all by ourselves." But it was not a large military operation, and they actually didn't have that much combat up north. I think it was partly a message to the Iraqis -- partly a message to the Turks, but I think mainly a message to the Kurds -- which is, "The U.S. government is here. Don't think you can go off by yourself."
What was the strategy of this northern front?
The original strategy of the northern front was to have the 4th Infantry Division -- a big, heavy, mechanized division -- come in through Turkey and fight its way down to Baghdad through the Sunni Triangle. Had they done that, you probably would have had less fighting than you've had there subsequently. When the Turks wouldn't allow the 4th Infantry Division to come in-- It's a heavy division. It would have to come in by land, trucked in, and also carried by train. Then the alternative was simply to get some U.S. military presence to fly the flag in the north, and that's why they went with this light infantry brigade, a paratrooper brigade. Nothing is lighter than paratroopers. They don't have tanks. They hardly have big guns. But it got some U.S. boots on the ground up north.
There were also special operations troops up north. As we saw in Afghanistan, a few special operations troops calling in air strikes can have a devastating effect. They actually did have some combat of that sort, where you had some Iraqis trying to move forward, and devastating air strikes were called in to stop them in their tracks.
Was the northern front strategy successful?
In narrow terms, the northern front strategy was successful, in that the Kurds didn't go off the reservation and declare independence, and U.S. forces successfully occupied the north. Eventually the 101st Airborne Division moved in and made its headquarters in Mosul, and Iraqi reconstruction began.
Arguably, Mosul has been much more successful than most of the rest of the country in reconstruction. I was in Mosul last week, and the local TV [station] has basically an Iraqi version of "American Idol." So, yes, I mean, with a minimal number of troops, they did achieve some U.S. military aims. But it was not what the U.S. military originally had conceived for northern Iraq.
What past military experience was this strategy modeled on? I'm talking about the special forces air power, and indigenous forces strategy.
The entire U.S. war in Iraq, I think to a surprising degree, is very unusual. There's only one real analogy to it, one real model for it, and that's the U.S. war in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. I think no other military has ever fought in the way those two wars were fought. Afghanistan was kind of an extreme model. Basically, Afghanistan was conquered with 300 U.S. troops on the ground, working with several thousand Afghan allies.
But remember, those Afghan allies have been fighting for years, and have been unable to take Kabul. Once you had a few hundred U.S. special operations troops on the ground, calling in air strikes with everything from small fighter jets to gigantic B-52s, it changed the entire operation on the ground in Afghanistan. I think that's the model that Donald Rumsfeld had in mind when he first began looking at U.S. military planning for Iraq.
Ultimately, what you came out with was a far different war plan. But I think the guiding spirit of the small, precise use of force, and not having more troops on the ground than absolutely necessary-- That lesson was taken from Afghanistan, and I think applied to the Iraq war plan.
Prewar-- Describe the key assumptions on how this war was going to be fought.
This was actually a story I wrote with Rick Atkinson, and in some nice timing, it ran on a Sunday before the war actually began. We laid out the assumptions, the thinking, the planning for the war. It was extremely straightforward. It was going to be a drive to Baghdad as quickly as possible. The major concern they had was a 500-mile unprotected convoy supply line back to Kuwait.
The major concern they had about the Iraqis was that they would be attacked with chemical weapons. They knew that Iraq did not have nuclear [weapons]. They did think that Iraq had deliverable biological weapons. But they did fear -- wrongly, as it turns out -- that Iraq had chemical weapons, and would use those. I remember being told by officers flatly, "When we hit the Red Line, which is the line just outside of Baghdad, chemicals will be used against us." Officers believed this to their marrow.