War strategy

#26
#26
E4? Where did that come from? Someone who completely assumes wrongly and contradicts repeatedly their own posts, you sound as lousy as half the losers in Congress. Who flaked out?

When you decide to not sound like someone on the playground back in third grade with cheap insults, I'll consider you someone worthwhile and knowledgeable on the issues. Seeing you stumble over your own points makes me question your own credibility and background on history and current events.
Just because you say my posts contradict each other does not make it so.
 
#27
#27
I really hope you know that there is a difference between when a war begins and when combat between individual units begins.

So aerial attacks do not count for combat? I guess both Bush's need to reword their speeches and their own definition of combat then. Take it up with your boss.
 
#29
#29
The starting point is anytime prior to the invasion. Logistics do not have to be included, however, be reasonable. You should also take into account the intel that you, as CENTCOM Commander, would be receiving. This includes corroborated reports from the CIA that Iraq not only possesses WMD, but that he is prepared to use them.

Just another quick question, do I have allies?

Exampe, am I allowed to use Turkey? Or is this after they pulled out?

Before I do this, is this just a quarrel with OWB and Cspin?

Do I deal with propaganda such as this?
Scoop: British Intelligence Leak - Iraq Invasion Strategy

Also, does the "war" start on March 6th?
 
#30
#30
Ok, how about we change this up a little bit.

How about we take it from March 26th.

March 26
American forces encircle Najaf after several days of intense battles.
Paratroopers from the U.S. Army's 173rd Airborne Brigade land in northern Iraq to open the battle on the northern front. The 173rd and Special Operations troops begin operating with Kurdish forces in the north, calling in air strikes when Iraqi forces try to move forward.

There was a substantial special operations campaign going on before the beginning of the war. Can you summarize the scale of that activity, and what they were doing?
In some ways, you could say this war began in about September 2002, which is when the special operations campaign against Iraq really geared up. It began as a psychological operations campaign with various components, all aimed at swaying Iraqi public opinion. Millions upon millions of leaflets were dropped on Iraqis, beginning around that time, I think fall of 2002, and escalating in number right up to the eve of the war in 2003.
It's a good question as to whether it had any success at all. This was probably, if not the largest, then the second-largest psychological operations campaign in history. I have yet to see an iota of evidence that it affected the opinion of a single Iraqi. No Iraqi I interviewed has ever mentioned, "Oh, yes, I got one of those leaflets, and that really persuaded me." I think it would be a good subject for a congressional investigation. I don't want to prejudge it. I'm not sure that anything really came of that.
Then the next phase on the special operations campaign was inserting various drops of stuff inside Iraq, so forces could operate behind enemy lines, or at least inside Iraq. So you had advance little bases put up with some ammunition, some water, communications gear, batteries, and so on -- 50 kilometers, 100 kilometers inside Iraq -- especially western Iraq, which is a largely empty desert, but which was of strategic concern because they didn't want Israel attacked from there. So that gears up.
Then the third thing was getting special operations troops into some of the key infrastructure, especially the oil fields, to prevent the oil fields from being destroyed, from manifolds from being blown up, things like that.
blank.gif

March 26, the U.S. paratroopers land in northern Iraq to open the battle of the northern front -- the new northern front, basically. Can you describe the landing, what it was for, and how it opened the northern front?
The U.S. had sworn that, even if it couldn't get the 4th Infantry Division in, it would get some troops into northern Iraq. So they went to the 173rd Air Brigade, which is based in Italy, its paratroopers, and got them into northern Iraq. They actually did a jump into Iraq, which a lot of people in the military thought was kind of cheesy, because there was no military need for it. There was sort of a sense that they were showing off. The response was, "Well, it demonstrates to the Iraqis that we're paratroopers." I'm not sure it meant a lot to people in Iraq.
So 173rd goes in, and starts operating with Kurdish forces in the north. I think it probably did achieve an American presence there, kept the Kurds from sort of saying, "We're in charge here all by ourselves." But it was not a large military operation, and they actually didn't have that much combat up north. I think it was partly a message to the Iraqis -- partly a message to the Turks, but I think mainly a message to the Kurds -- which is, "The U.S. government is here. Don't think you can go off by yourself."
blank.gif

What was the strategy of this northern front?
The original strategy of the northern front was to have the 4th Infantry Division -- a big, heavy, mechanized division -- come in through Turkey and fight its way down to Baghdad through the Sunni Triangle. Had they done that, you probably would have had less fighting than you've had there subsequently. When the Turks wouldn't allow the 4th Infantry Division to come in-- It's a heavy division. It would have to come in by land, trucked in, and also carried by train. Then the alternative was simply to get some U.S. military presence to fly the flag in the north, and that's why they went with this light infantry brigade, a paratrooper brigade. Nothing is lighter than paratroopers. They don't have tanks. They hardly have big guns. But it got some U.S. boots on the ground up north.
There were also special operations troops up north. As we saw in Afghanistan, a few special operations troops calling in air strikes can have a devastating effect. They actually did have some combat of that sort, where you had some Iraqis trying to move forward, and devastating air strikes were called in to stop them in their tracks.
blank.gif

Was the northern front strategy successful?
In narrow terms, the northern front strategy was successful, in that the Kurds didn't go off the reservation and declare independence, and U.S. forces successfully occupied the north. Eventually the 101st Airborne Division moved in and made its headquarters in Mosul, and Iraqi reconstruction began.
Arguably, Mosul has been much more successful than most of the rest of the country in reconstruction. I was in Mosul last week, and the local TV [station] has basically an Iraqi version of "American Idol." So, yes, I mean, with a minimal number of troops, they did achieve some U.S. military aims. But it was not what the U.S. military originally had conceived for northern Iraq.
blank.gif

What past military experience was this strategy modeled on? I'm talking about the special forces air power, and indigenous forces strategy.
The entire U.S. war in Iraq, I think to a surprising degree, is very unusual. There's only one real analogy to it, one real model for it, and that's the U.S. war in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001. I think no other military has ever fought in the way those two wars were fought. Afghanistan was kind of an extreme model. Basically, Afghanistan was conquered with 300 U.S. troops on the ground, working with several thousand Afghan allies.
But remember, those Afghan allies have been fighting for years, and have been unable to take Kabul. Once you had a few hundred U.S. special operations troops on the ground, calling in air strikes with everything from small fighter jets to gigantic B-52s, it changed the entire operation on the ground in Afghanistan. I think that's the model that Donald Rumsfeld had in mind when he first began looking at U.S. military planning for Iraq.
Ultimately, what you came out with was a far different war plan. But I think the guiding spirit of the small, precise use of force, and not having more troops on the ground than absolutely necessary-- That lesson was taken from Afghanistan, and I think applied to the Iraq war plan.
blank.gif

Prewar-- Describe the key assumptions on how this war was going to be fought.
This was actually a story I wrote with Rick Atkinson, and in some nice timing, it ran on a Sunday before the war actually began. We laid out the assumptions, the thinking, the planning for the war. It was extremely straightforward. It was going to be a drive to Baghdad as quickly as possible. The major concern they had was a 500-mile unprotected convoy supply line back to Kuwait.
The major concern they had about the Iraqis was that they would be attacked with chemical weapons. They knew that Iraq did not have nuclear [weapons]. They did think that Iraq had deliverable biological weapons. But they did fear -- wrongly, as it turns out -- that Iraq had chemical weapons, and would use those. I remember being told by officers flatly, "When we hit the Red Line, which is the line just outside of Baghdad, chemicals will be used against us." Officers believed this to their marrow.
blank.gif


Push toward Karbala Gap and then Baghdad.....push toward the border areas.........how about we take the war from this point and discuss what could have/should have been done. Or maybe nothing at all should have been done......
 
#31
#31
Sorry OE, but I thought I would let the heat settle a little bit before I got back to this...and back on topic.

I believe that Gen. Franks plan was more than well suited for his strategic aims and for the intel he had while planning and executing OIF 1. Franks was operating under the following assumptions:
Iraq had WMD.
Iraq is more than willing to use WMD.
Superior Iraqi forces would stay to fight.
Although the Fedayeen was growing and being recruited into Iraq, the Iraqi people were not radical enough to embrace terrorism.
Saddam's regime had no regard for human life and embraced the use of torture and massacre.
The United States population would not tolerate massive U.S. casualties, nor massive Iraqi civilian casualties.

These assumptions forced Franks to strike hard and strike fast, concerning himself more with a massive WMD strike that could potentially destroy a U.S. division than with closing the borders along Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia.

This is where my thinking would have strayed with Gen. Franks, not to take anything away from him, just different approaches.

The British took the city of Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, in a most incredibly efficient way. They established a cordon 2 miles outside of the city and layed seige. For two weeks, SAS, SBS, and Snipers worked within the city identifying targets, both military and personnel. They deciphered routines of key targets and placed themselves in position. When the order was given, all of the key leaders in Basra were eliminated, by sniper fire and precision artillery, within an hour. Two days later, the British walked into the city with their helmets off.

I would have used this approach on every major Iraqi city. I would have exposed my troops to a WMD attack and exposed the civilians of the cities to torture and massacre by Ba'ath officials. If either of those events turned out, I believe it would have only gained worldwide support for our military operation, and in a Global War on Terror, nothing is more fundamental to victory than resolve and support for your cause. With worldwide support, the U.S. would have been able to threaten Iran, Syria, and North Korea with military action, the threat would not be empty. However, without worldwide resolve, other nations and terrorist organizations understand that the U.S. is isolated in its efforts, and therefore, they operate with a greater freedom of movement and with each passing day, their cause is strengthened.
 
#32
#32
Further, IMO, when the U.S. is suffers great casualties in individual battles, it seems as though the U.S. population supports the cause, and it strengthens their resolve. However, when U.S. forces are nickeled and dimed, a little bit of casualties everyday, the U.S. population loses support for the cause and calls for an end to the war.
 
#34
#34
Interesting notion, how would you categorize Korea?
North Korea is a paper tiger. This is a very accepted notion among every military strategist I have talked with. However, North Korea has a very interesting contingency plan concerning any military ground assault over the DMZ: They have an actual operation (which the name is escaping me right now) on paper, in which they will round up the citizens of Pyongyang, and begin to march them at gun point towards the invading forces, forcing us to either cease and desist or choose to stay and share responsibilty in the slaughter of a million or more innocent people. Nobody in uniform doubts Kim Jong Il's resolve to carry out such an operation. Therefore, our initial strikes would be limited to precision airstrikes, in hopes of destroying NKs senior leadership early (which calls for extensive human intelligence, much of which we lack in NK) or the largest precision air assault operation in military history, in which our Air Assault troopers would find themselves inserted into the very heart of Pyongyang, fighting what would most likely be an incredible intense street battle.

For these reasons, I believe the Pentagon would rather not strike NK pre-emptively (if we are not attacked first, then we would have to be very cautious about civilian casualties.) If we are retaliating, I believe we would use the USAF unmercifully against NK...memories of Dresden would come back.
 
#35
#35
For these reasons, I believe the Pentagon would rather not strike NK pre-emptively (if we are not attacked first, then we would have to be very cautious about civilian casualties.) If we are retaliating, I believe we would use the USAF unmercifully against NK...memories of Dresden would come back.

I tease about how I love carpet bombing and napalm, but do you actually believe the public would allow mass bombing to occur?

I do not think we, politicians and public, have the stomach for a World War II type of war.
 
#36
#36
I tease about how I love carpet bombing and napalm, but do you actually believe the public would allow mass bombing to occur?

I do not think we, politicians and public, have the stomach for a World War II type of war.
We would if North Korea attacked us, for the following reason:

If North Korea ever attacks the U.S. or our interests, they will try to destroy us as much as they can with one blow. I believe this would manifest itself as full scale nuclear attacks on Camp Casey, and the rest of our South Korean posts, Okinawa, and more than likely Tokyo ( in an effort to gain support from China, akin to Iraq's scud attacks on Israel.)

As much as the American population enjoys priding themselves on loving everyone from everywhere, if we lost upwards of 10,000 U.S. citizens (military is included in this) U.S. citizens would want blood, and would tolerate a great deal of it before they decided our military had gone too far.
 
#37
#37
As much as the American population enjoys priding themselves on loving everyone from everywhere, if we lost upwards of 10,000 U.S. citizens (military is included in this) U.S. citizens would want blood, and would tolerate a great deal of it before they decided our military had gone too far.

I hope your are right. I want to believe it but I can't.

Ok, now lets go into Chinese involvement. China is my World War III scenario.
 
#38
#38
I hope your are right. I want to believe it but I can't.

Ok, now lets go into Chinese involvement. China is my World War III scenario.
Well, at least from the historical perspective, U.S. troops have been pretty good at assaulting beach heads...

Looking at China, U.S. troops would have absolutely no land in which to stage an assault from. We could potentially make four large beach landings, but each of those would be against very large Chinese forces, as they would not have to worry about being attacked on any other front. We could drop the 82nd and the 173rd somewhere in Western China, simply to divert some Chinese forces, however, the benefit would be negligible, in my opinion.

We would also most likely face some intense Naval Battles in the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea, off the coast of Taiwan, and the South China Sea, just to get our troops to beachheads. It would be an incredibly long and arduous task.
 
#39
#39
Would it be feasable, plausible, practicle, to mount operations from S. Korea, India or Russia?
 
#40
#40
Would it be feasable, plausible, practicle, to mount operations from S. Korea, India or Russia?

In my previous response, I am assuming that we would have staging rights in Afghanistan, S. Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines. I doubt Russia would give us staging rights and having staging rights in India would only be useful for an Airborne drop (which would still encounter difficulties over the Himalayas, IMO.)
 
#41
#41
Ok, do we have air and naval superiority?

Where are your proposed landing areas?

Ningbo
Qinhuangdo
Qingdoa

Possible Inchon strategy and cut the Chinese force in half?
 
#42
#42
Ok, do we have air and naval superiority?

Where are your proposed landing areas?

Ningbo
Qinhuangdo
Qingdoa

Possible Inchon strategy and cut the Chinese force in half?
Not exactly sure where exactly my landings would be. I would definitely need tidal information, terrain of beaches, etc. Inchon was a great site because of the extreme tides, however, I doubt it would have been chosen had it not been for the tides. My landings would try to avoid major urban and built up areas for two reasons: Most urban areas on the coast have extensive harbors that are tough to assault and second, no soldier/marine wants to assault a beach head and then move right into an intense urban street fight.
 
#43
#43
Also, I believe the US possesses air and naval superiority regardless of foe. However, we this superiority would not be as complete against China as it was against Iraq and Afghanistan. Since China is so large in area, we could not easily debilitate their Air Force nor their radar systems as efficiently as we have in OIF and the Gulf War, or what we could do in Korea.
 
#44
#44
The coast of Fukien Province, sits across from Taiwan.

The country is so large, what would be your primary targets/goals.
 
#45
#45
It is large, however, we would be fighting a very conventional enemy. Therefore goals would be much more militaristic: military posts and centers, and Chinese industry.
 
#46
#46
Do you think their army could actually fight a sustained war?

I could be way off, but I think a war in their own country would bring about revolt and change.
 
#47
#47
This is all kind of pointless considering most all of our troops and resources are in Iraq.
 
#48
#48
On this point, I would disagree. I feel that the majority of the Chinese population is very satisfied with their gov't (the Fallon Gong excluded.) The Chinese gov't is very progressive and moving towards private ownership and capitalism in a way in which the country will not fail (see Russia since 1990.) This is the main reason why I do not foresee China as a threat, also a big reason why I believe Kim Jong is forcing the issue so much, as he can see China becoming more pro west everyday.
 
#50
#50
On this point, I would disagree. I feel that the majority of the Chinese population is very satisfied with their gov't (the Fallon Gong excluded.) The Chinese gov't is very progressive and moving towards private ownership and capitalism in a way in which the country will not fail (see Russia since 1990.) This is the main reason why I do not foresee China as a threat, also a big reason why I believe Kim Jong is forcing the issue so much, as he can see China becoming more pro west everyday.

I have also considered your argument.......still do not know if I buy it though..........

Although I do read a lot of Clancy........The Bear and the Dragon.....
 

VN Store



Back
Top