Suppose I lend you money to do something incredibly risky that will make money for a while and then will either be OK or collapse. As a lender, this is really stupid because I don’t share in the upside. I have a fixed upside–the interest I earn, and I risk being wiped out. So I normally wouldn’t do that. But if the guy in the corner, Uncle Sam, indirectly indicates to me that he’ll cover my losses by an informal too big to fail policy, then I lend you the money, knowing that I can’t lose. If the investment collapses and you go bankrupt, you shrug and count the money you’ve been paying yourself in salary. I shrug because the government pays me the money you owed me. The taxpayer is left holding the bag. It was the taxpayer. I was effectively using their money when I made the loan.
It is the creditors who get bailed out. That’s what matters. Bear Stearns and AIG didn’t get bailed out. Their creditors did. The only creditors that didn’t get bailed out were Lehman. (As far as I can tell, their creditors were mostly Asian banks, not enough political pull here
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). So, essentially our past "too big to fail" doctrine allows big institutions to just get bigger - not the direction we want to be going.
Bankrutpcy is a different animal. Creditors are left holding the bag. By letting these companies run their normal course upon failure, the "easy money" problem can be minimized. However, reversing this course by beginning to let these institutions fail may not be possible anymore. I just don't know.