So for starters Slick you acknowledge there is no recognized requirement for militia service in having a firearm? Glad you could join the rest of us in reality.
Have you actually read how weak the arguments were on the dissent for Heller? I have. They were so bad Scalia pretty much openly mocked several of the points they (poorly) attempted to make. Here's some high points for you.
Justice Stevens places overwhelming reliance upon this Court’s decision in
United States v.
Miller,
307 U. S. 174 (1939) . “Hundreds of judges,” we are told, “have relied on the view of the amendment we endorsed there,”
post, at 2, and “even if the textual and historical arguments on both side of the issue were evenly balanced, respect for the well-settled views of all of our predecessors on this Court, and for the rule of law itself … would prevent most jurists from endorsing such a dramatic upheaval in the law,”
post, at 4. And what is, according to Justice Stevens, the holding of
Miller that demands such obeisance? That the
Second Amendment “protects the right to keep and bear arms for certain military purposes, but that it does not curtail the legislature’s power to regulate the nonmilitary use and ownership of weapons.”
Post, at 2.
Nothing so clearly demonstrates the weakness of Justice Stevens’ case.
Miller did not hold that and cannot possibly be read to have held that. The judgment in the case upheld against a
Second Amendment challenge two men’s federal convictions for transporting an unregistered short-barreled shotgun in interstate commerce, in violation of the National Firearms Act, 48 Stat.
1236. It is entirely clear that the Court’s basis for saying that the
Second Amendment did not apply was
not that the defendants were “bear[ing] arms” not “for … military purposes” but for “nonmilitary use,”
post, at 2
. Rather, it was that the
type of weapon at issue was not eligible for
Second Amendment protection: “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use of a [short-barreled shotgun] at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear
such an instrument.” 307 U. S., at 178 (emphasis added). “Certainly,” the Court continued, “it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.”
Ibid. Beyond that, the opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right.
This holding is not only consistent with, but positively suggests, that the
Second Amendment confers an individual right to keep and bear arms (though only arms that “have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”). Had the Court believed that the
Second Amendment protects only those serving in the militia, it would have been odd to examine the character of the weapon rather than simply note that the two crooks were not militiamen. Justice Stevens can say again and again that
Miller did “not turn on the difference between muskets and sawed-off shotguns, it turned, rather, on the basic difference between the military and nonmilitary use and possession of guns,”
post, at 42–43, but the words of the opinion prove otherwise. The most Justice Stevens can plausibly claim for
Miller is that it declined to decide the nature of the
Second Amendment right, despite the Solicitor General’s argument (made in the alternative) that the right was collective, see Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, pp. 4–5.
Miller stands only for the proposition that the
Second Amendment right, whatever its nature, extends only to certain types of weapons.
It is particularly wrongheaded to read
Miller for more than what it said, because the case did not even purport to be a thorough examination of the
Second Amendment . Justice Stevens claims,
post, at 42, that the opinion reached its conclusion “after reviewing many of the same sources that are discussed at greater length by the Court today.” Not many, which was not entirely the Court’s fault. The respondent made no appearance in the case, neither filing a brief nor appearing at oral argument; the Court heard from no one but the Government (reason enough, one would think, not to make that case the beginning and the end of this Court’s consideration of the
Second Amendment ). See Frye, The Peculiar Story of
United States v.
Miller, 3 N. Y. U. J. L. & Liberty 48, 65–68 (2008). The Government’s brief spent two pages discussing English legal sources, concluding “that at least the carrying of weapons without lawful occasion or excuse was always a crime” and that (because of the class-based restrictions and the prohibition on terrorizing people with dangerous or unusual weapons) “the early English law did not guarantee an unrestricted right to bear arms.” Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 9–11. It then went on to rely primarily on the discussion of the English right to bear arms in
Aymette v.
State, 21 Tenn. 154, for the proposition that the only uses of arms protected by the
Second Amendment are those that relate to the militia, not self-defense. See Brief for United States, O. T. 1938, No. 696, at 12–18. The final section of the brief recognized that “some courts have said that the right to bear arms includes the right of the individual to have them for the protection of his person and property,” and launched an alternative argument that “weapons which are commonly used by criminals,” such as sawed-off shotguns, are not protected. See
id., at 18–21. The Government’s
Miller brief thus provided scant discussion of the history of the
Second Amendment —and the Court was presented with no counterdiscussion. As for the text of the Court’s opinion itself, that discusses
none of the history of the
Second Amendment . It assumes from the prologue that the Amendment was designed to preserve the militia, 307 U. S., at 178 (which we do not dispute), and then reviews some historical materials dealing with the nature of the militia, and in particular with the nature of the arms their members were expected to possess,
id., at 178–182. Not a word
(not a word) about the history of the
Second Amendment . This is the mighty rock upon which the dissent rests its case.
There's actually a great deal more, some of which (by high brow court standards) pretty much clowns Stevens et. al and their contortions in trying to pound the square militia peg through a round hole but not a single person reading this,
especially you, believes you have any actually interest in edification on the matter.