Hillary Clinton's private email server was a spy magnet for the Russian, Chinese, Iranian and other intelligence services, say current and former intelligence officials.
Intelligence professionals fear that the use of the privately installed server, free of certified government defenses against foreign interception, has been a boon to foreign cyberspies.
"By using her own private server with email which we now know was wholly unencrypted for the first three months of Hillary Clinton's tenure as secretary of state she left this easily interceptable by any decent 21st century SIGINT service," said John Schindler, a former National Security Agency counterintelligence officer. SIGINT is shorthand for signals intelligence, or electronic spying.
"The name Clinton right on the email handle meant this was not a difficult find," Schindler said. "We should assume Russians, Chinese and others were seeing this."
'Epic' Counterintelligence Disaster
"In all, this is a counterintelligence disaster of truly epic proportions, not to mention that, since Clinton admitted she did not use higher-classification email systems at all" systems like SIPR and JWICS, Schindler said "we have to assume some bleed-over into her unsecured private email too, which makes this even worse."
SIPR is the Secret Internet Protocol Router network that the Department of Defense runs to ensure secret communications for the U.S. military, other agencies and certain allies. JWICS is the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System for top-secret government communication. Both provide secure communications for the State Department and secretary of state. Clinton's private server was not protected by the Department of Homeland Security's Einstein intrusion detection system, which relies on NSA systems, for official State Department emails.
"She may have deleted 30,000 e-mails before turning her files over to the State Department, but that doesn't mean that the Russians and the Chinese don't have them," said Michelle Van Cleave, former U.S. National Counterintelligence Executive.
The lure of reading a secretary of state's emails would exert a pull on any foreign spy, intelligence officials say.
Where, on a scale of one to 10, would any sitting secretary of state rank as a target of foreign spies? "10, of course," said Van Cleave. "That being the case, all of her e-mails would have been potentially of interest to any number of foreign parties."
"A target like this would be at least a 10, maybe 10-plus if the enemy knew the email address and server," said Robert W. Stephan, a former counterintelligence analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency who also served 19 years in the CIA. "If a foreign intelligence service determines that it is indeed the secretary of state's private communications/e-mail/server and even given the security measures that were set up, it would still be a top target for some sophisticated services," Stephan said. "Obviously Chinese, Russian, and Cuban, and possibly Iranians and North Koreans."
How would adversary spy services exploit this intelligence? "The positions, the interests, the communications between the secretary of state and her staff are of great interest to any foreign intelligence service, whether hostile or friendly," said Paul Joyal, former director of security of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
"The American secretary of state using an open, unprotected server? That's an invitation to a party," said a veteran intelligence officer who asked for anonymity because he still holds active clearances. "All of her private musings. There's no secretary of state who doesn't communicate with classified information. How the hell could she do her job without it?"
"From a counterintelligence perspective, (for) anyone with any responsibility for intelligence, counterintelligence and security, this thing is a monumental disaster," the longtime senior intelligence officer said. "It's a disaster for U.S. policy. It's a huge boon for the former KGB and the Iranians."
Some experts are concerned that foreign spies could have penetrated the server as a gateway to breaking into other government systems, including classified communications.
"The real question is, what if any intelligence collection was being done on a private server somewhere?" Joyal said. "The only way to know is for the proper federal authorities to impound the server and do a forensic analysis."
"It would be possible for a hostile service to use the server as a platform to deliver other malware to other targets of their choosing, based on their knowledge of whom the former secretary and president were communicating with," Joyal said.
'Vast Deception Potential'
Foreign spies could use their access to Clinton's server to warp or distort information that government officials rely on. "If they're getting into her server, they're not just extracting stuff," said a senior former Defense Department official who spoke on condition of anonymity. "They're going to do things that could be planted from other sources."