It is a real shame that

[Gramps]

book tour.....they will not ask him as they are probably afraid of what his answer will be

They did not ask who he was supporting.

He did say Romney was wrong concerning Russia.

He did discuss the UN presentation.

He said we should have went in to Iraq with a larger force to preserve the peace. There was no question that Baghdad would easily fall, the real work was after that and the leaders thought if Baghdad fell it would basically be over.

I can't remember. the Generals name but Powell discussed him saying we would need 200,000 (?) troops in Iraq and he got chastised for saying so.

He was not very happy with the civilian leadership concerning Iraq.

 

[OrangeEmpire]

so, was the question asked while you were watching?

no........

 

[therealUT]

and his route to those positions was questionable. His "command experience" was questionable at best. His command persona doesn't exist and he was a fence sitter from the word go. He's a perfect political general, but isn't the guy to be in charge. Isn't ever going to be. He's a staff guy and organizer. I want command style leadership for a job, I'm not calling Powell.

This.

 

[OrangeEmpire]

This.

In short, he is a step ahead of our current politicians

 

[BigPapaVol]

In short, he is a step ahead of our current politicians

That's an absurdly low bar.

 

[T-TownVol]

In short, he is a step ahead of our current politicians

YOU are a step ahead of our current politicians OE

 

[OrangeEmpire]

That's an absurdly low bar.

And?

Better than W, Algore, Herman Munster, Oreo or McCain

 

[OrangeEmpire]

YOU are a step ahead of our current politicians OE

Ty

 

[cd12]

and his route to those positions was questionable. His "command experience" was questionable at best. His command persona doesn't exist and he was a fence sitter from the word go. He's a perfect political general, but isn't the guy to be in charge. Isn't ever going to be. He's a staff guy and organizer. I want command style leadership for a job, I'm not calling Powell.

Spot on! I would also suggest that he was born without a backbone!

 

[T-TownVol]

That's an absurdly low bar.

see post #31

 

[Gramps]

I don't get the dishing of Gen. Powell.

He is one of the most respected men over the last 25 years.

The UN presentation was a huge blunder, other than that he has had a great career, imo.

I wish he was running for POTUS. He is 1,000% better than the two options we have.

 

[therealUT]

I don't get the dishing of Gen. Powell.

He is one of the most respected men over the last 25 years.

The UN presentation was a huge blunder, other than that he has had a great career, imo.

I wish he was running for POTUS. He is 1,000% better than the two options we have.

He was the main voice advising against finishing the job in 1991.

His department was the department that fervently pushed de-Baathification in Iraq, which led to severe instability and the major problems of 2005 and 2006.

After the fact, he came out and said he was very much against the original troop numbers, saying that he knew that they would not be able to control the country after the initial invasion; yet, he decided to remain on as Secretary of State, anyway (his implicit consent demonstrates a lack of personal conviction and integrity; a lack of integrity that was demonstrated previously with his handling of and response to the My Lai massacre).

After he finally spoke up about the lack of adequate troop numbers, he then voiced his lack of support for the troop surge. This displays a lack of consistency and coherence, and appeared to be motivated by purely political reasons.

What has Powell done that you would consider laudable?

 

[therealUT]

More thoughts on Powell:

By "his approach" I assume you mean Gen. Tommy Franks' and General Myers' plan?

Listening to either Shinseki or Powell regarding anything of substance is a path to immediate failure (hence, things took a drastic and terrible turn when the DoD handed the reigns over from Jay Garner to Paul Bremer and the State Dept.)

Colin Powell is an *ss-clown. Shinseki is right up there with him.

I do find it interesting that the Sec Def took the fall, though. The policy that failed was all on the side of the State Department. Colin Powell came out smelling like roses, though.

Powell is one of the few members of Bush's cabinet that the majority of Americans still view favorably.

If the majority of Americans ever view me favorably, I will kill myself.

 

[Abe Hoffman]

Powell was involved in the attempted cover up of the My Lai massacre.

 

[OrangeEmpire]

I have yet to see where he would not be an upgrade

 

[Gramps]

His department was the department that fervently pushed de-Baathification in Iraq, which led to severe instability and the major problems of 2005 and 2006.

You trying to rewrite history?

The State Department and the CIA challenged the implementation of the de-Ba'athification policy in Iraq.

The DOD was the architects of the policy.
The exile leader of the Iraqi National Congress Ahmad Chalabi considered an unreliable informant by the CIA and the State Department was very influential within the Department of Defense’s construction of a post-war occupation strategy for dealing with the Ba'ath Party

Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith created the Office of Special Plans to devise the stragedy for the occupation.
Walter Slocombe accepted the position of overseeing the implementation.

All of this occurred under the purview of the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

 

[T-TownVol]

I have yet to see where he would not be an upgrade

still stepping over that low bar there OE

 

[therealUT]

You trying to rewrite history?

The State Department and the CIA challenged the implementation of the de-Ba'athification policy in Iraq.

Bremer worked for who...?

What were the original debaathification orders?

L. Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator of Iraq, issued two sweeping orders in May 2003: one outlawed the Baath Party and dismissed all senior members from their government posts; the other dissolved Iraq's 500,000-member military and intelligence services. In November 2003, Bremer established a Supreme National Debaathification Commission to root out senior Baathists from Iraqi ministries and hear appeals from Baathists who were in the lowest ranks of the party's senior leadership. The party's foremost leaders--some 5,000 to 10,000 individuals--were not permitted to appeal their dismissals.

How many Baathists were dismissed?

Bremer's first order led to the firing of about 30,000 ex-Baathists from various ministries. Some 15,000 were eventually permitted to return to work after they won their appeals, says Nibras Kazimi, a former adviser to the debaathification commission and currently a visiting Iraq scholar at the Hudson Institute. All military officers above the rank of colonel were barred from returning to work, as were all 100,000 members of Iraq's various intelligence services.

What changed?

In April 2004, Bremer announced that debaathification had been "poorly implemented" and applied "unevenly and unjustly," and said he supported a plan to allow "vetted senior officers from the former regime" back into the military services. At the time, the Iraqi insurgency was picking up speed, and some argued that a blanket purge of Baathists and the dismissal of the Iraqi army were at least partially to blame. Baathists "who do not have blood on their hands," and who were "innocent and competent" could play a role in Iraq's reconstruction, then-coalition spokesman Dan Senor announced on April 24, 2004. Two months later, Bremer dissolved the Supreme National Debaathification Commission, but the panel, with support from some members of the interim government, continues to operate. Interim Prime Minister Allawi backed the return of vetted ex-Baathists to the security services after his appointment in June 2004.

IRAQ: Debaathification - Council on Foreign Relations

Bremer was State.

Though the policy later found few defenders at the top level of the administration, de-Baathification initially had broad support among the relevant cabinet departments and agencies. The approach was promoted in the State Department's Future of Iraq Project that, as noted, later became touted in the media as the neglected plan for postwar Iraq.
=====
After Bremer announced the policy in May, he appointed Ahmad Chalabi, a member of the Iraqi Shia majority, to administer it. With Chalabi in charge, just as the President had feared, de-Baathification gained a reputation for score settling.

Known and Unknown p.515
Donald Rumsfeld

Nobody in defense, that I worked with or talked to, ever thought that de-Baathification was a good idea.

 

[therealUT]

Personally, I think Christopher Hitchens's description of Powell is the best:

Colin Powell, who has never been wise before any event, always has Bob Woodward at his elbow when he wants to be wise afterwards.

 

[OrangeEmpire]

still stepping over that low bar there OE

Gary Johnson is my man, you cant tell me Powell isnt an upgrade over the past 12 yrs.

 

[OrangeEmpire]

Personally, I think Christopher Hitchens's description of Powell is the best:

Smart man

 

[Gramps]

Bremer worked for who...?



Bremer was State.



Nobody in defense, that I worked with or talked to, ever thought that de-Baathification was a good idea.

Trut you are wrong on this issue.

Bremer said that on 9 May 2003 Douglas Feith showed him a draft of an order for the De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,’ and later that day he received his ‘marching orders’ in a final memo from Rumsfeld.


Bremer was, in effect, the US Viceroy in Iraq. President
Bush’s important decision was made without consulting his Secretary of State or National Security Adviser.

From the Intelligence and National Security
Vol. 25, No. 1, 76–85, February 2010

 

[therealUT]

Trut you are wrong on this issue.

Bremer said that on 9 May 2003 Douglas Feith showed him a draft of an order for the De-Baathification of Iraqi Society,’ and later that day he received his ‘marching orders’ in a final memo from Rumsfeld.


Bremer was, in effect, the US Viceroy in Iraq. President
Bush’s important decision was made without consulting his Secretary of State or National Security Adviser.

From the Intelligence and National Security
Vol. 25, No. 1, 76–85, February 2010

You did very well in taking that out of context. Did you read the entire piece? First, debaathification, not to the extent that Bremer instituted it, was cleared through the NCS (to include Powell) under Jay Garner. Second, Rumsfeld signed off on an outline of the plan (which, from the article, I read as more in tune with Garner's plan), but the ultimate "go" was given at a level above Rumsfeld. Third, Bremer only reported to Rumsfeld because DoD was the landowner in Iraq; Powell never asserted himself in Iraq and, therefore, Bremer ended up with pretty much free reign (even when Powell heard about how far Bremer was taking deBaathification, he did nothing...which, is not a quality I want in a leader). Fourth, the persons who did, by position, report to Rumsfeld and the DoD, to include General Abizaid, continually talked to Rumsfeld about how such a wide-ranging lustration would negatively affect the situation on the ground (this is noted in the article you cite, and Rumsfeld talks about this in his memoir, but neither Bush nor Powell would do anything to reign in Bremer).

It is possible that Bremer made the decision entirely on his own. But it seems unlikely that the Bush White House would allow this to happen. Given what is publicly known now, the likely range of decision makers is narrow. President Bush implied that he did not make the decision, and George Tenet said that it was made ‘above Rumsfeld’s pay grade’. As in Arthur Conan Doyle’s short story, ‘Silver Blaze,’ something might be inferred from the failure of any White House staffers to defend or explain the decisions.61 The Vice President’s office was known for its opacity and lack of leaks; the dogs that did not bark might very well have been Cheney’s loyal staffers.

http://pfiffner.gmu.edu/files/pdfs/Articles/CPA Orders, Iraq PDF.pdf

Bremer, according to Rumsfeld's memoir, did make the decision completely on his own. Powell and Bush, even though Powell expressed a disagreement to Rice, never attempted to stop Bremer.

 

[YorkVol]

You did very well in taking that out of context. Did you read the entire piece? First, debaathification, not to the extent that Bremer instituted it, was cleared through the NCS (to include Powell) under Jay Garner. Second, Rumsfeld signed off on an outline of the plan (which, from the article, I read as more in tune with Garner's plan), but the ultimate "go" was given at a level above Rumsfeld. Third, Bremer only reported to Rumsfeld because DoD was the landowner in Iraq; Powell never asserted himself in Iraq and, therefore, Bremer ended up with pretty much free reign (even when Powell heard about how far Bremer was taking deBaathification, he did nothing...which, is not a quality I want in a leader). Fourth, the persons who did, by position, report to Rumsfeld and the DoD, to include General Abizaid, continually talked to Rumsfeld about how such a wide-ranging lustration would negatively affect the situation on the ground (this is noted in the article you cite, and Rumsfeld talks about this in his memoir, but neither Bush nor Powell would do anything to reign in Bremer).



Bremer, according to Rumsfeld's memoir, did make the decision completely on his own. Powell and Bush, even though Powell expressed a disagreement to Rice, never attempted to stop Bremer.

The only part I take exception to is the last. Rumsfeld had a lot more influence than he reports in his memoirs and had a hand in this decision, as did Cheney. Powell was truly the odd man out in Bush's circle of advisors, but Rumsfeld owns a large piece of the blame for the early mistakes.

 

[Gramps]

You did very well in taking that out of context. Did you read the entire piece? First, debaathification, not to the extent that Bremer instituted it, was cleared through the NCS (to include Powell) under Jay Garner. Second, Rumsfeld signed off on an outline of the plan (which, from the article, I read as more in tune with Garner's plan), but the ultimate "go" was given at a level above Rumsfeld. Third, Bremer only reported to Rumsfeld because DoD was the landowner in Iraq; Powell never asserted himself in Iraq and, therefore, Bremer ended up with pretty much free reign (even when Powell heard about how far Bremer was taking deBaathification, he did nothing...which, is not a quality I want in a leader). Fourth, the persons who did, by position, report to Rumsfeld and the DoD, to include General Abizaid, continually talked to Rumsfeld about how such a wide-ranging lustration would negatively affect the situation on the ground (this is noted in the article you cite, and Rumsfeld talks about this in his memoir, but neither Bush nor Powell would do anything to reign in Bremer).



Bremer, according to Rumsfeld's memoir, did make the decision completely on his own. Powell and Bush, even though Powell expressed a disagreement to Rice, never attempted to stop Bremer.

Architects of the policy
Per National Security Presidential Directive 24,[25][26]

The Department of Defense was the principal organization in charge of the occupation. To this end, Paul Wolfowitz and Douglas Feith created the Office of Special Plans in order to devise Department of Defense strategy for occupying Iraq. In addition to Wolfowitz and Feith, Walter Slocombe accepted the position of overseeing the implementation of the Department of Defense’s occupation strategy. All of this occurred under the purview of the then Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. According to Charles Ferguson’s film interview with Gen. Jay Garner, L. Paul Bremer told Garner that "I was given my orders." This led Garner to believe that Bremer was not responsible for the content of the policy, but was executing Department of Defense policy.

Another important actor in the creation of the policy of de-Ba'athification was exile leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC) Ahmad Chalabi. Considered an unreliable informant by the CIA and the State Department, Chalabi was nonetheless influential within the Department of Defense’s construction of a post-war occupation strategy for dealing with the Ba'ath Party. According to Rajiv Chandrasekaran, Douglas Feith, one of the primary architects of the de-Ba'athification policy, was heavily influenced by the ideas promoted by Ahmad Chalabi and the Iraqi National Congress.

Other organizations and individuals involved in the process of challenging the implementation of the de-Ba'athification policy included the US Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, Gen. Jay Garner, Col. Paul Hughes (Director of Strategic Policy for the US Occupation, 2003), Robert Hutchings (Chairman, 2003–2005), National Intelligence Council), Ambassador Barbara Bodine, and Col. Lawrence Wilkerson (Chief of Staff for Secretary of State Colin Powell, 2002–2005).