Rasputin_Vol
"Slava Ukraina"
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This is common in this country in a wide variety of companies and industries. This country doesn't value engineers, craftsmen and technicians. Instead, the bean counters, finance guys and upper managers like Carly Fiorina (liberal arts majors) run our corporations and our govt.In what I've read I'd say those comments come from two sources. Marketing guys get the blame for the "Fortunately I have all the skills of a used car salesman, and I have the ability to use the Jedi mind trick" type comments. Engineers for the "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys" type. As an engineer who has faced cultures like the one at Boeing, I get exactly what they are saying. Management simply puts "yes" guys with no real engineering experience in place to run the show - it's done all the time - meet the schedule, costs, don't make waves, and most of all get me my bonus.
Boeing moved corporate management (much of it financial types inherited in the McDonnell-Douglas merger) from Seattle to Chicago - effectively divorcing management from engineering. Don't talk to the engineers, and you don't have to learn about "problems"; after all those engineers are just of prima donnas who are never satisfied. Fortunately we live more in a world of constant recalls rather than one of fatal
consequences. For me I loved engineering and problem solving, but I'm very happy in retirement ... nothing could drag me back into a corporate environment.
My brother flew for the AF for over twenty years and then Delta for over twenty more. I told him from the start Boeing was going to take a hard hit on this one, and he disagreed. I could see how the new engine placement and power rating was a significant problem, and he thought a competent pilot could manage the problem. I said "Yes, IF he knows what is between him and the control surfaces, and Boeing is being dishonest about that."
This is common in this country in a wide variety of companies and industries. This country doesn't value engineers, craftsmen and technicians. Instead, the bean counters, finance guys and upper managers like Carly Fiorina (liberal arts majors) run our corporations and our govt.
Engineering costs money. And that money can't be pushed up the ladder to the parasites and finance guys in these companies.
The Boeing 737 Max is built on top of a 55+ year old platform. Instead of Boeing redeisgning something from scratch, they tried to go cheap (thanks to the bean counters) and place a new engine on top of an old platform. And in their minds, software is cheaper than hardware, so they expected the computers and control systems to smooth things over instead of actually engaging in real engineering design and doing what Airbus did.
Their problem right from the start was that the landing gear was too short; therefore, limiting engine diameter. It worked with engines before the era of bypass when the engines were smaller. They might have gotten away with the more powerful engines, if they'd managed to pull off a landing gear redesign. But once they moved the engines and added power it doesn't really take much more than introductory mechanics (the college engineering course) to figure out that everything changed ... and just about all of it bad. Apparently to some people an airplane is just a stiff block and it doesn't matter where you push it forward, but that just isn't so.
On June 30, 2005, The Boeing Company hired McNerney as the chairman, President and CEO. McNerney oversaw the strategic direction of the Chicago-based, $61.5 billion aerospace company with a focus on spending controls.[10] With more than 160,500 employees, Boeing is the largest manufacturer of commercial airliners and military aircraft, with capabilities in aircraft, rotorcraft, electronic and defense systems, missiles, satellites and advanced information and communications systems.
As Boeing's first CEO without a background in aviation, he made the decision to upgrade the 737 series to 737 MAX instead of developing a new model.
Yeah it screams of a lack of alpha engineers in leadership positions. I remember a not so long ago time that I didn’t want to get on an airplane if it didn’t say Boeing on it. But their engineering culture seems to be totally transformed in a very bad way now.In what I've read I'd say those comments come from two sources. Marketing guys get the blame for the "Fortunately I have all the skills of a used car salesman, and I have the ability to use the Jedi mind trick" type comments. Engineers for the "This airplane is designed by clowns who in turn are supervised by monkeys" type. As an engineer who has faced cultures like the one at Boeing, I get exactly what they are saying. Management simply puts "yes" guys with no real engineering experience in place to run the show - it's done all the time - meet the schedule, costs, don't make waves, and most of all get me my bonus.
Boeing moved corporate management (much of it financial types inherited in the McDonnell-Douglas merger) from Seattle to Chicago - effectively divorcing management from engineering. Don't talk to the engineers, and you don't have to learn about "problems"; after all those engineers are just of prima donnas who are never satisfied. Fortunately we live more in a world of constant recalls rather than one of fatal consequences. For me I loved engineering and problem solving, but I'm very happy in retirement ... nothing could drag me back into a corporate environment.
My brother flew for the AF for over twenty years and then Delta for over twenty more. I told him from the start Boeing was going to take a hard hit on this one, and he disagreed. I could see how the new engine placement and power rating was a significant problem, and he thought a competent pilot could manage the problem. I said "Yes, IF he knows what is between him and the control surfaces, and Boeing is being dishonest about that."
I recently spent 2 years on the A350, and Airbus is light years ahead of Boeing in technology. The A350 has the most beautiful wing of any airplane I have ever flown, and it actually moves flight controls in response to turbulence and CG movement as fuel burns off.Yeah it screams of a lack of alpha engineers in leadership positions. I remember a not so long ago time that I didn’t want to get on an airplane if it didn’t say Boeing on it. But their engineering culture seems to be totally transformed in a very bad way now.
I’d love to know the role and experience level of the person who made the clowns comment.
Boeing stopped trying to design airplanes when Southwest was at the top and everybody else (basically) was in bankruptcy. All their chips went to the center of the table on that airplane. They (supposedly.. as rumor has it) destroyed the tools needed to build the 757 which is STILL the only narrowbody airplane that could go from LGA to LAX with people, luggage and cargo.
I said it elsewhere, but they need to set up a guillotine in Chicago and go all French Revolution on the management at BA.
I wouldn't be surprised to see Boeing aircraft division spun off and bankrupted to save the rest of the company.
Getting back to the 737, Boeing F'd up when they tried to cheap out by modifying a nearly 60 year old air frame so they could sell it to airlines as a "new and improved" version of the venerable 737.I recently spent 2 years on the A350, and Airbus is light years ahead of Boeing in technology. The A350 has the most beautiful wing of any airplane I have ever flown, and it actually moves flight controls in response to turbulence and CG movement as fuel burns off.
Getting back to the 737, Boeing F'd up when they tried to cheap out by modifying a nearly 60 year old air frame so they could sell it to airlines as a "new and improved" version of the venerable 737.
I don't know squat about airplanes, but I do know something about industrial controls and in my business we would have never relied on just one sensor for a process that could wreck the machine, which it seems Boeing decided to make an option. I can hear the sales pitch now "don't want your plane to crash? Buy the second angle of attack sensor, but you'll really never need it". We always doubled down on critical sensors and when they didn't agree stopped the process to save the equipment, except in this example the equipment was a plane and it killed people.
From my recollection there was only one AOA sensor and two was an option. The bottom line is when you have a sensor that removes control from an operator it damn well better be right. Boeing reminds me of the guy on the original Diehard movie that was cramming cocaine up his nose. They didn't listen to their engineers, they listened to their bean counters. I've see this way too many times when decisions are made to get a quarter end or monthly bonus all else be damned.It seems like they actually installed two AOA sensors (and I could well be wrong on that), but that the software didn't properly account for failures (disagreement between sensors) or alert pilots to a discrepancy between the two. It also seems like the AOA sensors were of debatable quality. Almost like it was a multi phase thing - unacceptable acceptance inspection, failure to vet suppliers, SW that basically ignored warnings (like don't worry, it has to be an instrumentation problem; the turbine always works), and a really really bad SW development program. But, hey, those H1-B visas get us some really cheap engineers and programmers who won't question what we tell them to do.
From my recollection there was only one AOA sensor and two was an option. The bottom line is when you have a sensor that removes control from an operator it damn well better be right. Boeing reminds me of the guy on the original Diehard movie that was cramming cocaine up his nose. They didn't listen to their engineers, they listened to their bean counters. I've see this way too many times when decisions are made to get a quarter end or monthly bonus all else be damned.
Since the initial crash last October, Boeing has been updating the MCAS software on the 737 Max to use data from the plane's two AOA sensors, rather than relying on one sensor. Critics question why the airplane's system wasn't originally designed that way.
"From the beginning it should have been a fail-safe design, which would have relied on two inputs to make sure that you weren't sensitive to one failure," said Peter Lemme, a former Boeing flight-controls engineer who helped design systems for the 757 and 767.
Lemme, who was subpoenaed by a grand jury in an investigation into the 737 Max, said he doesn't understand why it took two fatal crashes for Boeing to make those changes.
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In addition to not including inputs from two AOA sensors in its original design, Boeing did not flight test AOA sensor malfunctions and how MCAS software would respond, according to several sources.
A former Boeing pilot who tested the 737 Max, who requested anonymity due to fears of negative repercussions, told CNN "I don't think we appreciated the ramifications of a... failure of an AOA probe."
Another source familiar with the 737 MAX testing said the failure of an AOA sensor was not flight tested, but rather "analyzed in the design and certification" of the aircraft, and it was determined trained pilots would have been able to handle the failure.
A second former Boeing test pilot was surprised to learn that the company had relied on a single sensor, as opposed to a redundant system, to perform such a vital function in the first place.