rbroyles
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The main complications in Iraq came from not planning procedures for contingencies likely to arise that in fact did arise. Such as there not being a wholesale embracing of their "liberators" by the Iraqis, and how to get the hell out.
the lack of planning was definitely a problem.
there are no viable occupation strategies.I disagree. It was more of a case of 5 dogs all leashed together and trying to run in different directions. Rumsfeld, as the SecDef failed to create and implement a cohesive strategy regarding post combat operations in Iraq.
There were a lot of viable strategies that fell on deaf ears.
there are no viable occupation strategies.
because the compilation of all that advice was more troops than Rumsfeld believed palatable to our press.There were definitely things that were done right that were not done enough, and across the board.
I fully understand that after "combat operations" (as declared by Bush) ceased that it wouldn't just be bunnies and butterflies. But a lot of the experience of the "boots on the ground" Battalion commanders that were briefed directly to the JCS did not get piped to DoD strategy.
because the compilation of all that advice was more troops than Rumsfeld believed palatable to our press.
I think he was caught between a rock and hard place. He wanted more troops to meet the needs on the ground but believed limited troops (probably correctly) was what Americans wanted to hear. He was trying to use the limited number of troops to avoid words like quagmire and such.Well, that is part of it. We definitely are paying the piper for military cutbacks in the 90s... but Rumsfeld put far too much weight behind technology, ignored military feedback regarding the scope of operations in Iraq.
We were definitely geared for a different style of operation/war than what we encountered in Iraq, but simply put Rumsfeld's postitions did not provide the dynamic kind of reaction that would be required to shift equipment issue and training to the 18-20 year olds that the success of those operations would depend on.
I think he was caught between a rock and hard place. He wanted more troops to meet the needs on the ground but believed limited troops (probably correctly) was what Americans wanted to hear. He was trying to use the limited number of troops to avoid words like quagmire and such.
I agree, but he still had to battle with the brass to try and implement it. There was huge give and take there.no chance, Rummy wanted small elite forces from the outset he didn't like large forces because he wanted to be the face of a changing Army. He really believed he could pull this off with minimal troops.
My comment was 100% about Rumsfeld's abrasive nature, not his qualifications. With that said, Rumsfeld was not liked by many active military personnel.... make no mistake, he was a civilian making decisions against career military professionals.
If Panetta did play a vital role in the policy decisions concerning the middle east under Clinton I have all the reason I need to dislike this choice.
Emerging from the Washington courthouse, Panetta said he spent the day answering in detail questions about his knowledge of Clinton's relationship with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky. "I am personally not aware of any improper relationship, sexual or otherwise, by this president with any of the White House interns or anyone else for that matter," Panetta said.
I think he was caught between a rock and hard place. He wanted more troops to meet the needs on the ground but believed limited troops (probably correctly) was what Americans wanted to hear. He was trying to use the limited number of troops to avoid words like quagmire and such.
but the brass will always ask for more troops and he was trying to foster a new mindset for our military. He might not have gotten it done, but he's right for the future of our services. Smaller forces, rapidly maneuverable but with enormous combat power is what he's after. We don't have that capability today because we've been fighting the heavy Fulda Gap style war for a long time.Well, absolutely being any senior brass would be between a rock and a hard place in dealing with Iraq, but his inability to apparently work with the military that his position clearly requires only made that rock and that hard place grow more imposing. Also, from what I understand, he was absolutely against any form of troop number boosting in Iraq at any point, which directly butted heads with what senior military wanted. Also, fewer troops contribute to fewer casualties in a very off logic way I suppose.
but the brass will always ask for more troops and he was trying to foster a new mindset for our military. He might not have gotten it done, but he's right for the future of our services. Smaller forces, rapidly maneuverable but with enormous combat power is what he's after. We don't have that capability today because we've been fighting the heavy Fulda Gap style war for a long time.
He also couldn't win in appeasing both sides of that argument, but ultimately is boss was our civilian world, not Franks, Abizaid and Co.
but the brass will always ask for more troops and he was trying to foster a new mindset for our military. He might not have gotten it done, but he's right for the future of our services. Smaller forces, rapidly maneuverable but with enormous combat power is what he's after. We don't have that capability today because we've been fighting the heavy Fulda Gap style war for a long time.
He also couldn't win in appeasing both sides of that argument, but ultimately is boss was our civilian world, not Franks, Abizaid and Co.