Just skimmed it.
This case, Richardson, interprets a specific statute and so the holding applies narrowly to that statute, not broadly to all statutes that mention another crime.
It does do a good job of explaining what I was trying to describe in my other post:
“Calling a particular kind of fact an "element" carries certain legal consequences.
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224, 239 (1998). The consequence that matters for this case is that a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously finds that the Government has proved each element.
Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U. S. 356, 369-371 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
Andres v. United States, 333 U. S. 740, 748 (1948); Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 31(a).
The question before us arises because a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.
Schad v. Arizona, 501 U. S. 624, 631-632 (1991) (plurality opinion);
Andersen v. United States, 170 U. S. 481, 499-501 (1898). Where, for example, an element of robbery is force or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might conclude he used a gun. But that disagreement—a disagreement about means—would not matter as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the Government had proved the necessary related element, namely, that the defendant had threatened force. See
McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U. S. 433, 449 (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
In this case, we must decide whether the statute's phrase "series of violations" refers to one element, namely a "series," in respect to which the "violations" constitute the underlying brute facts or means, or whether those words
*818 create several elements, namely the several "violations," in respect to
each of which the jury must agree unanimously and separately.”
First bold part: What I’m saying is that “another crime” as used in the New York statute looks to be more like a “brute fact” than an “element” and that is consistent with how the NY Appellate Division has treated it.
Second bold part: this is where it’s clear it’s an issue of statutory interpretation. “Jury must be unanimous as to the elements” is the constitutional rule. Whether something is an element or a “brute fact” is a matter of statutory interpretation. So since this is a different statute, it could lead to a different outcome. I think New York’s high court, whatever they call it, is who gets to decide the meaning of their statutes, not SCOTUS, but I’m less certain about that when it’s tangential to a constitutional rule.
Also of note: he’s very careful to repeatedly mention *in federal cases* when citing the rule of unanimity. That has since been applied to the states, but I think it only happened in the past 5 years or so.
Travis
