So, in your opinion, Colin Powell's preference of actually involving the international coalition forces in the attack into Kuwait, was the right move, over Norman Schwartzkopf's preference to limit the main offensive to American troops, and let the coalition forces be there in reserve? It would be correct, because Powell was in the Pentagon, while Schwartzkopf was the field commander? Yet, in hindsight, the strategic failure of the Gulf War was that communications broke down between the international troops, mainly the German component, so the 'hammer' did not close in time. Therefore, instead of eliminating 75% of Saddam's army, we eliminated, at most 20-30%.
Another scenario, Carl Steiner and Maxwell Thurman, the field commanders in Operation Just Cause, pushed their plan over the Blue Spoon plan that was being pushed at the Pentagon. The success in OJC was incredibly efficient and led to far fewer casualties than Pentagon estimates.
Just because staffers in the Pentagon conduct some study, does not make it the only right way. There are plenty of instances in military history where the ground commanders overrode the Pentagon staffers and achieved sweeping success.
That being said though, a superior Shock and Awe and maybe an actualy engagement of more Iraqi forces through airpower, would have most likely caused a higher initial count of civilian casualties, but would have also reduced the amount of forces we needed to dedicate to the interior of the country, freeing more forces up to secure the border. However, the ROE sent down from the top, made it quite clear that we could only engage targets of opportunity in which there would be the most minimal of civilian casualties.